Prospects for global food security: a critical appraisal of past projections and predictions by McCalla, Alex F & Revoredo, Cesar L.
Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 35
Prospects for Global Food Security




International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A.
October 2001  
Copyright  2001 International Food Policy
Research Institute
All rights reserved. Sections of this report may be re-
produced without the express permission of but with




List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
Foreword vi
Acknowledgments vii
1. The Charge, the Context, the Challenge, and the Approach 1
2. Half a Century of Projections and Predictions, 1946–2000:
An Overview of the Landscape 7
3. Evaluation of Projections about the Food Situation 13
4. Evaluation of Surveys, Scenarios, and Predictions about the
Food Situation and Resource Constraints 26
5. Conclusions, Conjectures, and Closing Comments 39
Appendix 1: Brief Description of Food Projection Models 43
Appendix 2: Overview of Models Used to Project Food Situation 49
Appendix 3: Overview of Methods Used to Validate Models 54
Appendix 4: Review of the Methodology to Forecast Poverty 55
Appendix 5: Detailed Tables 56
References 66iv
Tables
1. UN forecast error of population by region in the year 2000 4
2. FAO projection errors: Wheat production and consumption, 1963–86 18
3. USDA projection errors: Wheat production and consumption, 1961–78 20
4. USDA projection errors: Demand for and supply of wheat, 1987 21
5. IFPRI projection errors: Food production, 1977 and 1986  21
6. FAO, ISU, and USDA cereal projection errors to 1985 22
7. FAO and FAPRI wheat projection errors to 1990 23
8. FAO, IFPRI, USDA, and World Bank cereal projection errors to 2000 24
9. World oil production, total and per capita, projected to 2000 31
10. Projection errors in water use by activity 32
11. Agricultural area by use, 1985–98 33
12. Projection errors in world gross irrigated area, 1960–2000 34
13. World Bank projections of number of absolute poor in developing countries
to 2000 36
14. World food projections: Summary 43
15. Comparison among FAO wheat projections 57
16. Comparison among USDA wheat projections for selected regions 58
17. USDA wheat projections for selected regions to 1990, 1995, and 2000 60
18. Comparison among IFPRI food production projections to 1990 and 2000 61
19. Comparison of cereal projections to 1985 according to FAO, USDA,
and Iowa State University models 62
20. Comparison between FAPRI and FAO wheat projections to 1990 for
selected countries 63
21. Comparison among FAO, IFPRI, USDA, and World Bank cereal projections
to 2000 64
22. Comparison of two forecasts to 2000 of the dynamics of water use in the world
by human activity 65v
Figures
1. The food gap 2
2. Quantitative food supply and demand projections and global models 9
3. World food surveys and predictions of food insecurity 11
4. Real price of West Texas intermediate crude oil, 1946–2000 31
5. World total fish catch, 1961–97 35vi
Foreword
During the last half century, a number of individuals and institutions, including the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and IFPRI, have engaged in pro-
jections of future food demand, supply, and related variables. In this 2020 discussion
paper, Alex McCalla and Cesar Revoredo compare projections with real-life outcomes.
Projections forecast outcomes on the basis of certain underlying factors. If such forecasted
outcomes are undesirable, changes may be made in the underlying factors so that the
projections may not, in fact, come to pass. Many projections serve this precise goal.
Therefore, the success of projections may not be that they match actual outcomes but that
they avoid such outcomes by promoting action to change underlying variables. Unlike
predictions, which are successful only if they match actual outcomes, projections that differ
from actual outcomes may reflect either poor projection models or changes in underlying
variables, possibly caused by the projections themselves.
In this discussion paper, the authors revisit the key projections and predictions about
global food security of the last half century and assess the extent to which they materialized.
They also critically review the factors that led to some projections and predictions being
more on the mark than others. This assessment has produced important lessons for future
crystal-ball gazing.
McCalla and Revoredo’s comprehensive and critical appraisal of past projections and
predictions of global food availability and needs offers useful insights not only to those who
wish to better understand the efficacy of such exercises but also to those who will undertake
projections and predictions in the future, and those who will respond by modifying policies
and priorities in order to get closer to the goal of a food-secure world for all. We hope that
this paper will contribute to an informed dialogue regarding the development and use of
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1. The Charge, the Context, the Challenge,
and the Approach
The Charge
Debates periodically spring up about whether the
world is facing imminent food shortages or con-
versely whether it is swimming in food surpluses.
These debates often swirl around projections or
predictions about prospects for global food se-
curity. We were asked in this paper to address the
accuracy of some of the projections and predic-
tions made over the past 50 years about global
food security.
Specifically our charge from the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was to “crit-
ically review, compare, and contrast the most
important and influential past predictions and
projections regarding food, poverty, and the en-
vironment.” We were to “revisit the key predic-
tions and projections of the last half century or
so, assess to what extent they materialized or not,
and critically review what factors led to some
predictions/projections being more on-the-mark
than others. Out of this should emerge some les-
sons for future crystal-ball gazing” (emphasis
added).
In this chapter we first place this charge in
historical context. We then turn to questions of
how to proceed with our task. This involves review-
ing how others have evaluated projections and
predictions. What we find is that the task is compli-
cated. The chapter concludes with an outline of the
paper.
The Context
It is popular to associate concerns about the
capacity of the world to feed a burgeoning popu-
lation with the name of Thomas Robert Malthus.
Malthus wrote the first edition of An essay on the
principle of population in 1798 and will always
be remembered for his proposition that human
population, if left unchecked, grows geometrically
(exponentially), whereas food supply grows arith-
metically (linearly). From algebra we remember
that a compounding function will always over-
take a linear function; therefore population will
inevitably press on the limits of food supplies (see
Figure 1).
Malthus was not the first to express concerns
about the world’s capacity to feed itself, but
he was the first to formalize the analysis into a
“model”: population growth rates, driven by the
differences between birth and death rates, versus
food production—land area times yield (yields
were assumed basically constant). In subsequent
editions of the Essay (six editions in total), Malthus
modified his position, becoming less certain of the
inevitability of shortfalls. He also became less sure
that population growth is limited by food supply,
admitting the possibility that they may be interde-
pendent (Evans 1998, 2–3). On the other side of
the question is the work of Ester Boserup (1965),
who argues the opposite case to that of Malthus,
namely that population growth stimulates agri-
cultural production.
Malthus, of course, was not the last to express
pessimism. One hundred years later, in 1898, Sir
William Crookes titled his presidential address to
the British Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence “The Wheat Problem,” and predicted wide-
spread starvation by the 1930s unless yields were
increased substantially (Dyson 1996, 5). Since
World War II there have been numerous predic-2








tions about the imminence of Malthusian doom:
Paddock and Paddock, Famine 1975! (1967);
Ehrlich, The population bomb (1970); Meadows
et al., The limits to growth (1972); Brown, By
bread alone (1974); Ehrlich and Ehrlich, The pop-
ulation explosion (1990); Brown and Kane, Full
house (1994); Brown, Gardner, and Halweil,
Beyond Malthus (1999), to name a few. These
predictions frequently contained “doomsday”
language: “In fifteen years the famines will be
catastrophic and revolutions and social turmoil
and economic upheavals will sweep areas of
Asia, Africa and Latin America” (Paddock and
Paddock 1967, 18); “The battle to feed all of
humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will un-
dergo famines—hundreds of millions of people
are going to starve to death in spite of any crash
programs embarked upon now” (Ehrlich 1970,
15); “In the early seventies the soaring demand for
food, spurred by both continuing population
growth and rising affluence, has begun to outrun
the productive capacity of the world’s farmers and
fishermen” (Brown 1974, 3).
Competing with these pessimists have been
a few who have basically seen no conflicts be-
tween rising populations and food supplies. They
might be called optimists. We have already men-
tioned Boserup and her hypothesis that population
growth stimulates food supply. Colin Clark, in his
book Starvation or plenty? (1970), claims that
there is plenty of land available to be improved for
food production. Julian Simon, in his book The
ultimate resource (1981), argues that the most
productive resource in the world is the human
mind. “Additional persons do, in fact, produce
more than they consume, and natural resources
are not an exception.”
Nestled between the optimists and pessimists
are a set of people and organizations who make
estimates about future food, population, and natu-
ral resource interactions based on projecting re-
cent history into the future. Our task is to determine
how accurate these predictions and projections
are. Those who make projections will be a major
focus of the analysis, although we will also com-
ment on some of those making predictions.
The Challenge
When we undertook the task, it seemed large and
complex but doable. We first needed to clarify
what would be accepted meanings of terms such
as “projection” and “prediction.” After various
consultations we have adopted the following
meanings, based in part on the Oxford English
Dictionary:
• A projection is a quantitative estimate, often
based on a model, of the future value of a
particular aggregate such as population, in-
come, or supply expressed as a point esti-
mate, or a percentage change, or a range of
values within confidence intervals.
• A  prediction is a qualitative forecast or
prophecy about a future outcome, for exam-
ple widespread famine, rising prices, or sup-
ply shortfalls.
We hope we have used the terms consistently even
if many others do not.
On the prediction side, we knew we would
be comparing qualitative predictions with quali-
tative outcomes. Evaluation would thus neces-
sarily be qualitative, relying mainly on judgment.
On the projection side, we assumed we could
look at successive projections from the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), the World Bank, IFPRI, the Food and
Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), and
so on, and compare these projections with actual3
outcomes. We could then compare individual
projections and present some statistical indicators
of performance. Then we assumed we would be
able to go back to the projection models and sug-
gest why some models are better than others.
Review of Previous Studies
We initiated our search for an appropriate meth-
odology by looking for literature on evaluation
and specifically for reviews of global food pro-
jection models. Past attempts at such reviews have
adopted one or more of the following approaches
to model comparison.
The first approach reviewed the structure of
models for consistency with appropriate concep-
tual or theoretical models. Relevant questions for
comparison would be: Are they appropriately par-
tial or general equilibrium? How do they treat
potential substitution among commodities and in-
puts? Are static models appropriate or should they
be recursive or dynamic? Are they consistent in the
way they aggregate countries in regions, and is
this aggregation optimal for the modeling goal?
We found two studies of this sort—one by Sanders
and Hoyt (1970), which compared food gap
projection models of FAO, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), USDA, and the President’s Science Ad-
visory Committee (PSAC), and one by Thompson
(1981), which evaluated a variety of international
agricultural trade models, including some also
used for projections.
A second approach, employed by Fox and
Ruttan (1984), Meyers (1995), and, to some ex-
tent, Poleman (1975), basically compared the
projections of the different models to the same
future date but could not compare projected and
actual numbers because the projection date had
not yet arrived.
A third approach, adopted by the Interna-
tional Agricultural Trade Research Consortium
(IATRC), compared the results from several trade
models for a preset number of simulation sce-
narios (for example, the effects of rising oil prices
or the impact of a major crop failure). The out-
comes of each model’s simulation were then com-
pared. Meilke (in Liu and Seeley 1987) concluded
that differences in model specification, commodity
coverage, country aggregation, and the way in
which policy was included rendered comparisons
virtually meaningless.
The disappointing part of the search for crit-
ical reviews of our target set of models was that
few dealt with the issue we had been asked to
address, namely to compare past projections with
actual outcomes. A partial validation of the results
was done for selected variables within his model
by Alexandratos (FAO 1995) and also by Tyers
and Anderson (1992) in an intra-sample simula-
tion, but we found none that had compared
models over time or compared the forecasts of
several models for specific dates with actual
outcomes.
We did, however, discover early in our review
a National Academy of Sciences/National Re-
search Council panel review of population pro-
jections (National Research Council 2000). Their
methodology was straightforward. Focusing on
the few agencies that made global population
projections (the UN Population Division, the
World Bank, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census),
they selected the most frequently used UN Popula-
tion Division estimates and compared their projec-
tions, made over the period 1957–98, with a
particular projection year, 2000 (see Table 1).
They found that errors in predicting global popula-
tion for 2000 had on average been off by less
than 4 percent (see “World” column in Table 1),
with the range being +7.1 percent to +0.5 per-
cent. They found that errors increased (1) as the
timeframe lengthened—4.8 percent for 5-year
projections to 17.0 percent for 30-year projec-
tions (read up any regional column); (2) as the
projections were disaggregated from global to
region to country; (3) for developing countries
compared with developed countries; and (4) for
small countries (especially under 1 million) com-
pared with large countries. Finally they noted that
all global projections were systematically higher
than the actual outcome; that is, the projections
overshot but not by much.
The panel then disaggregated the projec-
tions into the critical components that had been4
Table 1—UN forecast error of population by region in the year 2000






America Asia Europe Oceania
Former
USSR World
1957 −35.4 14.4 1.8 8.9 −0.5 −4.4 30.8 3.6
1963 −4.0 23.3 15.5 −2.6 −7.7 4.0 21.8 1.2
1968 −10.9 10.6 3.3 6.4 −0.4 5.8 9.1 7.1
1973 1.7 19.8 −3.4 2.4 −5.4 7.6 8.7 3.1
1980 6.6 9.3 −2.4 −0.1 −10.3 −2.2 7.0 1.0
1984 6.1 4.2 −2.8 0.6 −9.2 −1.1 8.2 1.0
1988 9.0 4.3 −3.8 4.1 −10.9 −1.7 6.2 3.1
1990 8.3 4.0 −3.8 4.5 −10.6 −1.7 6.4 3.3
1996 2.5 −0.6 0.7 2.2 −9.8 −1.3 −6.1 0.5
Sources: National Research Council (U.S.) 2000 and United Nations 1966, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1998, and
1999.
Notes: Based on the medium-variant population projection. Forecast error = 100 × (projected level − actual level)/actual level,
expressed as a percentage. A positive value indicates that the projection is an overestimate, a negative value an
underestimate.
forecast—fertility (crude birth rates), mortality
(crude death rates), and migration—and ana-
lyzed why errors increased with length of time,
disaggregation, and smaller country size. We ten-
tatively adopted this as the methodology for our
task and we turned to assembling as full a selec-
tion of projections as we could. We also assem-
bled a sample of predictions.
A Preview of Comparison
Difficulties
Over the past 50 years there have been at least 30
quantitative projections of world food prospects
(supply and demand balances), as well as nu-
merous predictions of dire shortages ahead. Pre-
dictions are more episodic, seeming to be tied to
periodic, but infrequent, increases in agricultural
prices as, for example, in the mid-1960s, 1972–
74, 1988, 1995–96.
Focusing first on “projections,” we thought
one should be able to contrast and compare the
30 or more that have been done. As we reviewed
the various studies we immediately encountered
difficulties. We found that cross-model compari-
sons would be virtually impossible at the global
level because of differences in
1. data sources and data completeness;
2. model specifications—for example static
vs. recursive and treatment of prices;
3. the timeframe of projections—medium
term (5–10 years) vs. long term (15–30
years);
4. commodity coverage and commodity
aggregations—small grains vs. field crops vs.
crops and livestock;
5. regional and country coverage—which
varies across models and within models over
time, so that world aggregates are almost al-
ways noncomparable;
6. units of projection—grains, cereal equiv-
alents, calories, and so on.
Even more constraining was the fact that we
could not even easily compare within the same
organization over time. We use IFPRI as an exam-
ple, but it is by no means unique. IFPRI has made
three ventures into the projection business, project-
ing up to the year 2000 or before. The first study,
published in 1977, made trend projections of sup-
ply of and demand for cereals in developing coun-
tries only, in cereal equivalents, to 1990 (IFPRI
1977). The second study, published in 1986
(Paulino 1986), made trend projections of supply
of and demand for total food consumption, in
cereal equivalents, to 2000 for more countries,5
but its commodity and country coverage differed
from that of the 1977 study. The third study, start-
ing in 1995, used the new IMPACT model (an
early version of this model under the name of
IFPTSIM can be found in Agcaoili and Rosegrant
1995), which is a recursive nonspatial global
commodity trade model with prices endogenous
to make projections to 2010 and beyond (see,
for example, Rosegrant, Agcaoili-Sombilla, and
Perez 1995). This model had further adjustments
in country and commodity coverage.
The point is that, each time, the model was
different, the universes of commodities and coun-
tries were different, and the units of projection
were noncomparable. Even FAO, which has pro-
duced seven updated projections at 5–10 year
intervals since the 1960s, has changed model
specifications several times and has constantly
adjusted country aggregations and commodity
coverage.
The bottom line is that quantitative compari-
sons of model performance can be done only a
model at a time, comparing the particular model
projection with actual data for the projection year.
This is quite limiting because we wanted to evalu-
ate and compare changes in performance within
a projection agency over time. We do attempt to
make cross-comparisons at a subglobal level
when we find comparable commodity definitions
(for example, wheat) for comparable geographic
aggregations. These cross-comparisons are useful
because they confirm, as in the population study,
that very large increases in deviations occur as
one disaggregates, in terms of both commodities
and regions/countries. We find that global pro-
jections may be quite close, say ±5 percent of
actual, but one component region may be under-
estimated by 25 percent, whereas another is over-
estimated by 30 percent. The errors offset each
other so that, globally, the projection looks quite
good. But is it? Should the global projection be
trusted when in reality it is the result of being
wrong twice, once in each direction? This is a
crucial question if the disaggregated components
are used more frequently—for example, livestock
in China—than the global aggregates. We return
to this question later in Chapters 3 and 5.
Thus, unfortunately, the analysis that follows is
necessarily fragmented and incomplete, at least in
terms of quantitative comparisons of model perfor-
mance. We try to augment our quantitative analy-
sis with qualitative evaluations and, as a last re-
sort, we make some assertions about what we
believe to be the case. Clearly modeling global
food security issues is an ever-evolving activity,
constantly changing and growing larger, more
complex, and more costly. The number of players
in the projection business is diminishing. It is now
basically down to FAO, FAPRI, IFPRI, and USDA.
Of course, the number of players in the prediction
business is larger and more fluid, with the numbers
and severity of forecasts rising with periodic rises
in global commodity prices or falls in global
stocks. However, we do feel that the effort we
report should provide feedback to modelers and
model users alike. All need to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the point projections
they discuss with such certainty.
Structure of the Work
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the
analysis of world food security projections and
predictions. Our analysis of natural resources con-
straints is limited to how resource stocks constrain
food production. Given that many of the analyses
of the 1980s and 1990s broadened concerns
beyond agricultural yields, we will briefly analyze
constraints related to energy, water, and land. We
also comment briefly on projections of fish avail-
ability, because fish are a significant source of
animal protein, especially in Asia.
On the demand side, we comment on poverty
projections as an important complement to tradi-
tional projections based only on average per
capita income. As argued by Johnson (1975),
FAO (1977), and others, the current food problem
is mainly a problem of affordability (access) rather
than one of availability; therefore income distribu-
tion issues are important.
Specifically we proceed as follows. Chapter 2
provides a historical overview of the evolution of
analytical approaches to the food challenge and
a review of the landscape of predictions and6
projections since 1946 (FAO’s first World food
survey year). Chapter 3 describes and analyzes
some of the more frequently used projection
models. We look at two classes of models: (a)
trend projection models, and (b) world commodity
trade models, which are also used for projecting
into the future. We close the chapter by comparing
projections within agencies over time and by com-
paring across agencies as much as is possible.
Chapter 4 presents our evaluation of sce-
narios, surveys (that is, projections made in the
context of world food surveys), and predictions
about the global food situation and resource con-
straints. We ask why these appear to have a much
higher likelihood of not coming true: is it that they
are longer term, and their almost always dire pre-
dictions lead to corrective measures that prevent
disaster from occurring; or do they underestimate
people’s capacity to substitute in production and
consumption; or do they underestimate the power
of the human mind to advance science and de-
velop new technology; or are they simply bad
predictors? We offer our conclusions and sugges-
tions for future prognosticators in Chapter 5.7
2. Half a Century of Projections and
Predictions, 1946–2000:
An Overview of the Landscape
The task of this chapter is to present an overview of
the landscape of predictions and projections that
have been made since World War II. The survey
may not be exhaustive, but in our view it identifies
the major players and a significant variety of
approaches.
Overview of Projections and
Predictions, 1946–2000
Before we begin the survey, a bit of context is
appropriate. Agriculture in the twentieth century
generally prospered up to and through World
War I, except when production was disrupted by
actual hostilities. In fact, productive capacity built
up during World War I resulted in excess supplies
and falling prices in the early 1920s. A world
depression, which resulted in inadequate de-
mand, led to excess marketable food supplies in
the 1930s and trade and prices collapsed. Thus,
the question in many minds after World War II was
whether history would repeat itself, with surpluses
and low prices, or whether there would be short-
ages because of more widespread devastation in
Europe and Asia. To deal with initial concerns
about falling prices, the governments of rich coun-
tries supported domestic prices. The Korean War
(1950–53) held up prices longer. By the early
1950s, European production was restored and
the concern, at least in the developed world,
turned to surpluses and surplus disposal. Re-
call that U.S. food aid programs (for example,
Public Law 480) originated in 1954 as an inter-
national surplus-dumping activity. In fact, FAO’s
50-year review of the State of food and agriculture
(2000b) characterizes the concerns of the 1950s
and early 1960s as ones of excess supply, not
shortage. Grain prices fell and stocks grew over
most of the 1950s and early 1960s. Stocks, par-
ticularly U.S. stocks, were drawn down substan-
tially in 1965–66 as the United States and others
shipped massive amounts of grain to Asia, particu-
larly to India, which had experienced two bad
monsoons. Immediately after this shock, there was
the rapid introduction of the so-called miracle
wheats and rices (1967–70), which became the
stuff of the “Green Revolution.” Prices steadied
and some optimism returned.
A coincidence of supply shortfalls and major
Soviet grain purchases doubled and tripled grain
prices in 1972–74, spawning many dire predic-
tions. However, real prices were soon back on
their long-term downward trend as production ex-
panded. Except for brief run-ups in 1988 and
1995–96, real grain prices continue to fall. Prices
at the end of the twentieth century were at a 100-
year low in real terms. It is our submission that
concerns about global food security heat up with
rising grain prices and/or declining stocks. Pre-
dictions reflect the spirit of their time.
It is our purpose in this section to provide an
overview of the landscape of projections and pre-
dictions since World War II. We have somewhat
arbitrarily divided them into two general areas:
(1) quantitative, model-based projections—these
are presented chronologically in Figure 2 (a tabu-
lar presentation of model characteristics can be
found in Appendix 1); and (2) global surveys and8
predictions (generally, qualitative forecasts of the
future)—these are presented in Figure 3, again
chronologically.
Quantitative Projections
The first three columns of Figure 2 are devoted to
global projections of food supply and demand
balances. Although the first quantitative estimates
of food supply difficulties came from the Food and
Agriculture Organization in three World food sur-
veys (FAO 1946, 1952, and 1963), we choose
not to call them projections. Rather they are survey-
based evaluations of the growth rates of food sup-
ply needed to meet minimal nutritional standards.
They are not projections of what would actually
happen. We treat these normative need state-
ments in some detail in Chapter 4.
FAO’s first Agricultural commodity projections
were prepared in 1962 for a Joint Session of the
United Nations Commission on International
Commodity Trade and the FAO Committee on
Commodity Problems. This study differed from ear-
lier FAO work in that it recognized that demand is
related to income, prices, and population, not to
nutritional standards. Production was estimated
on a trend basis using data from the 1950s. FAO
emphasized that the projections were estimates of
future outcomes based on specific assumptions as
to trends and policies. They were not targets of
what we would like. This distinction was drawn
perhaps to distinguish this approach from the ear-
lier World food surveys. The 1962 projections
began a series of medium-term projections, of
5–10 years ahead, which were published at
regular intervals from 1962 to 2000. There are
FAO projections for the following years: 1970,
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2005
(FAO 1962, 1967, 1971, 1979, 1986, 1994,
2000c). FAO has also produced three longer-term
projections: Agriculture: toward 2000 (1981) re-
vised as World agriculture: toward 2000 (1988);
Agriculture: toward 2010 (1993) updated as
World agriculture: toward 2010 (1995); and an
interim document, Agriculture toward 2015/30
(2000a).
The USDA became a player with the publica-
tion of The world food budget (USDA 1961).
However, as Poleman (1975) points out, it was
more akin to FAO’s World food surveys than to
later USDA projections, which began in 1971.
The Grains, Oilseed and Livestock Model (GOL)
published in 1978 (Rojko et al. 1978) repre-
sented significant methodological advances.
USDA continues to do short-term projections at
regular intervals.
Others have also made periodic forays over
the period. Some were short lived: the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) (Kristensen 1967; OECD 1968); Iowa
State University (Blakeslee, Heady, and Framing-
ham 1973); and the International Institute of Ap-
plied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (Fischer et al.
1988). Others persisted longer: IFPRI (IFPRI 1977;
Paulino 1986; Rosegrant, Agcaoili-Sombilla, and
Perez 1995, and onward) and FAPRI (1986, in Liu
and Seeley 1987; FAPRI 1995, and annually to
2000). A model developed at Michigan State Uni-
versity moved to the World Bank with Don Mitchell
and resulted in two studies titled the World food
outlook (Mitchell and Ingco 1993; and Mitchell,
Ingco, and Duncan 1997).
Although the players used a variety of model
specifications, they all have the common charac-
teristic of being strongly rooted in historical trends.
As we outline in Chapter 3, most produce mod-
erately optimistic medium-term projections that
aggregate production will be capable of meeting
projected food demand. However, some pro-
ject significant regional shortfalls in South Asia
and more recently in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
models are evaluated in Chapter 3.
The last family of models presented in Figure 2
are global simulation models of the Club of Rome
type. These are large models that project forward
various rates of resources consumption and deter-
mine if and when resource stocks will be ex-
hausted. Most, including four Club of Rome pro-
jections (Meadows et al. 1972; Mesarovic and
Pestel 1974; Herrera 1976; and Meadows,
Meadows, and Randers 1992) and Global 2000
(Barney 1980–81), projected severe resource ex-
haustion if the then (1960s) current trends of con-
sumption persisted. Therefore, they tended to be
considered pessimistic. They have been heavily9
Figure 2—Quantitative food supply and demand projections and global models10
attacked on methodological grounds as well as
being charged with not being grounded in empiri-
cal reality (Nordhaus 1973). In addition, there
was the Leontief, Carter, and Petri modeling of The
future of the world economy published in 1977,
which was more optimistic. These models are eval-
uated in Chapter 4.
Qualitative Predictions
Figure 3 presents a chronological array of writ-
ings that predict rather than project. The first
World food survey produced in 1946 by FAO
was followed by five more (FAO 1952, 1963,
1977, 1987, 1996). The most recent ones are
widely quoted because they estimate the number
of undernourished people in the world.
We have defined the next two categories in
Figure 3 as pessimistic and optimistic views of
world food prospects (McCalla 1994; Dyson
1996). The more pessimistic ones were labeled
neo-Malthusian by Dyson (1996) in his excellent
critique. Pessimistic views tend to be clustered
around perturbations in world markets in the mid-
dle 1960s (Paddock and Paddock 1964, 1967)
and early 1970s (Ehrlich 1970; Paddock and
Paddock 1976). Lester Brown began a long series
of analyses with a piece in Science in 1967. It said
the challenge of feeding a burgeoning and richer
population would be very difficult for conventional
agriculture. Brown became more optimistic briefly
in 1970 with Seeds of change, much to the
chagrin of the Paddock brothers (see the Preface
of Paddock and Paddock 1976). Since 1974,
Brown, with many different co-authors, has been
firmly on the more pessimistic side from By bread
alone (1974) to Full house (Brown and Kane
1995) and Beyond Malthus (Brown, Gardner,
and Halweil 1999).
There was another cluster of concerns in the
late 1980s and early 1990s: Ehrlich and Ehr-
lich (1990), Meadows, Meadows, and Randers
(1992), Postel (1992), Brown (1995). However,
many of these were now zeroing in on natural
resource constraints as being the major constraint
on global food supplies.
There also have been some interesting writ-
ings that have a degree of optimism: Russell
(1954), Cochrane (1969), Clark (1970), Johnson
(1975), Simon (1981), Simon and Kahn (1984),
Avery (1995), and Evans (1998). This diverse set
of literature is reviewed in more detail in Chapter
4.
Growth in Complexity and
Coverage
Over time our understanding of the global food
security challenge has become more complete,
but this completeness has made understanding the
interactions among a greater number of variables
more difficult and projecting outcomes more com-
plicated. It is not enough just to project population
to forecast demand. One also needs to know the
rate of income growth and have good estimates of
the evolution over time of how food expenditure
changes as incomes rise. Demand models would
be even more conceptually complete if changes in
income distribution could be included for all coun-
tries. Supply predictions have graduated from
trend projections of land area and yields to
the need to project changes in production in-
tensity, the relationship between yields and re-
search investment, the degree to which stocks of
resources—water, land, energy—potentially con-
strain output, and the impact of declines in fish-
eries on food security. Further questions of envi-
ronmental constraints continue to emerge. The
number of countries requiring analysis goes on
rising, as does the demand for more complete
commodity coverage.
Modelers have tried to respond to this in-
creased complexity. The early models (Malthus)
focused on a potential food gap by comparing
rates of growth of population with land avail-
ability. Right after World War II the focus shifted to
a requirements approach where minimum nutri-
tional needs were multiplied by population to pro-
duce projected food needs. In the same period the
potential of increasing yields of existing land was
added to supply projections.
But by the 1960s we came to understand that
food needs (normative) and demand (positive) for
food are not the same. Efforts were made to
project demand by including income and Engel11
Figure 3—World food surveys and predictions of food insecurity12
curves (that is, the statistical relationship between
consumption and income).
The late 1960s and 1970s led to further com-
plicating issues. On the supply side, the Green
Revolution focused us on favored versus less fa-
vored areas. It also began to raise environmental
and social issues about rapid increases in crop
yields. In addition, the 1960s showed that, while
modern medicine was cutting death rates rapidly,
birth rates remained high, leading to population
growth rates never before experienced. The popu-
lation bomb (Ehrlich 1970) reflects this concern.
Concerns about environmental issues and the
depletion of nonrenewable natural resources also
emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. All of
these issues—new varieties, population, and re-
source limits—were added to the issues of global
food security.
To complicate the issue of modeling further,
the price instability of the early 1970s illustrated
that earlier models’ assumptions of constant prices
were clearly inadequate. Prices affect both con-
sumers and producers and therefore own- and
cross-commodity relationships were needed both
in demand models and in supply projections to
reflect changes in prices and the resulting substitu-
tion among commodities. Moreover, the price run-
up illustrated that domestic policies significantly
influence world markets. Therefore new models
had to include domestic supply and demand,
country by country, with appropriate cross-
commodity relationships embedded and explicit
recognition of policy built in. Then the net trade
positions of all countries had to be integrated into
a world trade model, which was used to determine
equilibrium prices. These considerations caused a
shift from supply and demand gap projections to
global price equilibrium trade models, which
greatly increased the size of models and their de-
mands for data. All of these factors have led to a
fuller understanding of the complexity of the issues
but have made modeling that complexity more
difficult and much more expensive.
Finally, it should be noted, that starting in
the 1970s and strengthening in the 1980s and
1990s, there was expanded interest in poverty
and income distribution. Given the prevalence of
rural poverty in developing countries, linkages be-
tween food production and poverty became high-
lighted. Yet introducing explicit projections of pov-
erty into models proved difficult; only the Model of
International Relations in Agriculture (Linnemann
et al. 1979) has attempted to incorporate income
distribution.
In sum, the number of issues related to the
supply and demand sides of the food balance
equations has significantly increased. Modeling
approaches have grown more sophisticated,
clearly much larger, and more expensive. This
makes their evaluation, the task to which we turn in
Chapters 3 and 4, more challenging. Further, his-
tory’s boneyard is full of nice models that kept
growing and eventually died because no one kept
(or perhaps could afford to keep) them up. We will
return to the issues of cost and complexity in Chap-
ter 5.13
3. Evaluation of Projections about
the Food Situation
The purpose of this chapter is twofold—first to
review the evolution of the modeling used to
project the world food situation, and second to
evaluate the accuracy of these projections by com-
paring them with observed figures. Therefore our
analysis is limited to projections up to the year
2000.
In terms of the models selected for review, we
have included only those models used for quantita-
tive projections, concentrating our attention on
multi-region/country commodity models, and
leaving aside the two-country agricultural trade
models that have a long tradition in agricultural
economics (that is, models that consider only one
country or region on one side, and aggregate the
rest of the world on the other side). Hence, we
centered our review on two types of models: trend
projection models and world trade models. A brief
review of the characteristics of the main models is
presented in Appendix 1.
The Evolution of Analytical
Approaches
At least since the development of sedentary ag-
riculture 11,000 years ago, there have been
periodic discussions about the tensions between
agricultural production capacity and the number
of people to be fed. In fact, some argue that
hunters and gatherers were forced to adopt seden-
tary agriculture to increase food supplies to feed a
growing population. In early debates, the issue
was seen simply as a race between population
growth and available land for cultivation of crops
and for growing livestock fodder. However, the
debate became more formalized with the writings
of Malthus, which is the beginning point for
discussing models.
Modeling Supply
The model formalized by Malthus was, until the
twentieth century, basically population growth
versus land area growth. With improvements
in biological understanding—genetics and
agronomy—and the development of synthetic ag-
ricultural chemicals, substantially increased yields
per unit of land became an alternative to just ex-
panding land area in the late nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. Furthermore, genetically altering
plants to mature earlier allowed a greater number
of crops per year. Irrigation development led to an
increase in both yields and cropping intensity.
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century, the
supply side of the model had become more
sophisticated.
The annual percentage growth in supply (∆S)
equals the percentage change in area (∆A) plus
the percentage change in yield (∆ye) plus the per-
centage change in cropping intensity (∆I), or
∆S = ∆A + ∆ye + ∆I.
All three elements were sources of growth in sup-
ply in the twentieth century. However, the im-
portance of land area expansion declined sub-
stantially after World War II. The importance of
intensification (∆I) peaked in the 1980s with the
slowing down of the rapid expansion of irrigation
in developing countries. Thus, changes in yield
(∆ye) were, by the end of the century, the dominant
source of supply growth. Thus, what one hypothe-
sizes as to how these growth rates will change in
the future will make significant differences in one’s
predictions/projections, especially as the time-14
frame lengthens. If, for example, one believes re-
source stocks of land and water are limiting, then
one might assume ∆A and ∆I will be low and
possibly negative in the future. If, in addition, you
believe that chemical enhancement of yields is
subject to increasing environmental constraints,
you would perforce be a supply pessimist. If, on
the other hand, you saw modern science as an
inevitable savior you would be optimistic about
future yield increases (Avery 1995).
Modeling Demand
The modeling of food demand has also moved
beyond the projection of population growth rates.
Clearly, the number of mouths to feed remains a
powerful element in determining food demand.
However, we know that people at different income
levels eat different diets and that, as people be-
come better off, they eat a more diversified diet
including more protein and less starchy and high-
carbohydrate foods. Therefore, income levels and
income distributions also influence demand.
The first approach used was to assume coinci-
dence between food needs and food demand.
This was done early on by FAO by estimating per
capita nutritional needs for representative individ-
uals, stratified if possible by geography, sex, and
age, and multiplying these needs by estimated
population growth. However, this approach did
not yield the actual demand for food and was
abandoned in favor of income- and price-based
approaches in later FAO projections.
Thus, most economic projection models have
the same basic demand specification (the so-
called Ohkawa equation [Ohkawa 1967]): the
percentage change in the demand for food (∆D)
equals the percentage change in population (∆P)
plus the percentage change in income (∆Y), modi-
fied by how much of the additional income will be
spent on food (the income elasticity of demand η),
or
∆D = ∆P + ∆Y(η),
which says demand will grow with population and
income but the impact of income growth will
diminish as incomes rise (Engel’s law). More so-
phisticated models could use the distribution of
income in a country rather than average per
capita income. Hence, the more recent concerns
about building poverty into models.
Linking Supply and Demand
Given these two basic conceptual components,
there still remain several questions about how they
can be integrated and utilized to address issues of
global food security. These questions fall into two
categories: first, how are global supply and de-
mand numbers to be estimated; and, second, how
will the differences between supply and demand
in each country/region be reconciled.
The estimation of actual global supply and
demand numbers or of empirical demand and
supply functions is a nontrivial task. All start at the
country level, with estimates of supply of and de-
mand for selected commodities for some future
date. On the demand side, the first basic need is a
population estimate. All of the projection models
(except sometimes USDA) tend to use the same
exogenous source—the UN Population Division,
medium-variant. Estimating per capita consump-
tion is more difficult. If one has solid baseline data
on past and current consumption, then one needs
only to estimate how consumption will change
with changes in income (the income elasticity of
demand) and enter an estimate of how fast income
will grow. A more sophisticated model would in-
clude how the income distribution would change
with growth over time (taking poverty into ac-
count). In this way, given baselines of population
and consumption and appropriate growth rates of
population and income, one can project increases
in aggregate demand.
If there are no reliable data on consumption,
the problem is more difficult. In fact, in many
cases, consumption is measured as the residual
left after estimated net trade, losses, seed use, and
animal feed have been subtracted from estimated
production. FAO, in its early projections of food
needs, used a nutritional minimum standard (for
example, 2,600 calories per day) to compute per
capita nutrient requirements. This number was
then compared with estimated per capita avail-
ability to produce a per capita food gap (surplus),
which could then be multiplied by estimated popu-
lation to generate a national food gap.15
Estimation of the supply side is more problem-
atic. The traditional way would be to start with
historic baselines of area planted (or harvested) of
each commodity and yields per unit of land. The
product of area times yield would produce a base-
line of national production. Forecasting ahead
would require estimates of how much land would
enter or leave production over the projection
period and estimates of how much yields would
change. Most models compute trends in these vari-
ables and then project the trends into the future. A
final variable sometimes projected is changes in
land use intensity—that is, the average number of
crops per year.
Given these baselines of production and con-
sumption (or proxies for these); hypotheses about
rates of growth of population, income, land area,
crop and animal yields, and cropping intensity;
and estimates of the income elasticity of demand,
one can project national and global aggregate
supply and demand in the form of point estimates.
More sophisticated models would estimate supply
and demand functions and then apply these rates
of growth as factors shifting these functions over
time.
There are at least three ways to answer the
question of how we put supply and demand
together.
First, for trend projection models, simply add
up surpluses and shortages to determine projected
shortfalls (gaps) or surpluses at regional and
global levels. This approach assumes prices are
constant. Early models by FAO, IFPRI, OECD, and
USDA were of this sort. Projected world food gaps
were reported directly.
The second method is to enter the country’s
surplus or shortage into a model that minimizes the
cost of moving surpluses to shortage locations.
This is the so-called transportation model, which
estimates how food would flow between coun-
tries. This is called a spatial model because it esti-
mates actual trade flows over geographical re-
gions (that is, space). There are still no prices and
there could still be an overall shortfall or surplus.
The third method is to use the estimated supply
and demand functions for each country/region
(as opposed to trend projections of specific num-
bers). These country functions can be netted to
produce country excess supply or demand func-
tions, which can then be aggregated into a world
market. In the world market, prices will adjust until
global supply equals global demand. This is
called a nonspatial price equilibrium global trade
model. It should be noted that it is theoretically and
computationally possible to add a transportation
model to this nonspatial model and compute
projected trade flows that would allocate country
surpluses from specific origins to specific deficit
destinations (Takayama and Judge 1971). How-
ever, the modeling and computational cost of
doing this for large numbers of countries and com-
modities has rendered this approach exceedingly
costly and little used.
How these various models can be used to re-
port on food security issues is quite different. The
“gap models” report actual estimated food gaps;
for example, projected global demand in 2010
exceeds projected supply by 50 million metric
tons of grain. On the other hand, global trade
models cannot have global gaps (with the excep-
tion of small amounts due to changes in stocks).
Rather their indicator of “food problems” would
be increasing world prices. Of course, all models
allow us to look at particular countries or regions
in terms of whether there is an excess of supply or
demand.
In sum, all models require estimation of supply
and demand by commodity, by country, or by
region. These estimates may be based on simple
trend projections or on sophisticated supply and
demand models for each country/region. The
gaps in terms of actual quantities, or estimated
excess supply and demand functions, can be
added up globally. In the most complicated form,
excess supply and demand functions can be inte-
grated into a global spatial equilibrium model,
such as the USDA’s World Wheat Trade Model
(Dixit and Sharples 1987).
We have one final comment on model evolu-
tion. Early projection models were static. Let us
explain. Given a baseline of production and con-
sumption and projected rates of change in critical
parameters, an estimate is made for a particular
point in the future, for example 2020. This condi-16
tional projection says, given projected population
in 2020 and appropriate trends or growth rates,
we can project supply and demand in 2020. The
model gives us a point estimate for the future but
does not tell us anything about the path to that
point. An alternative approach would be to move
toward that final year by estimating the model a
year at a time and moving recursively toward the
end point. Sometimes these models are called
dynamic in that the path of adjustment can be
observed.
Evaluation of Food Balance
Projections
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the accu-
racy of projections to the year 2000 by different
agencies. We use the first method proposed by
Theil, which was also used by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences. This is to directly compare the
projected number with the actual figures for the
projection year (for a brief review of the methods
used to compare models see Appendix 2).
We started the comparison by computing the
percentage error of the projection, which is de-
fined as how much, in percentage terms, the pro-
jection overstated or understated the actual out-





A positive number indicates that the projection
overstated the observed figure and a negative one
that it understated it. We omitted the percentage
error in cases where the absolute numbers were
very small and the percentage error was greater
than 100 percent (for example, if the prediction is
0.3 and the actual figure is 0.1, it means that the
actual number was overestimated by 200 per-
cent, which is meaningless since the absolute fig-
ures are quite small).
While constructing the comparison tables, we
faced a number of problems that illustrated the
heterogeneity of the models. We believe that this
heterogeneity reduces the usefulness of models to
policymakers. A policymaker would like to com-
pare models that offer different opinions (similar to
the use of scenarios within an agency model).
Often, as argued by Liu and Seeley (1987), indi-
vidual models are designed as special tools for the
agencies’ own purposes. Thus policymakers who
want projections must decide first which agency,
among the available ones, deserves more confi-
dence and then use that model.
We found the comparisons difficult to perform
because of problems related to units of measure-
ment, commodity and country coverage, and
different base periods used for the projections.
Nevertheless, we were able to construct two types
of comparisons: within projections made by a sin-
gle agency (for example, for projections made by
FAO, USDA, and IFPRI) and across agencies (for
projections made by FAO, USDA, and Iowa State
University to 1985, and by FAO and FAPRI to
1990). For a detailed description of all models
considered, see Appendix 1.
The comparison of projections within and
across agencies proved to be an arduous task,
and in many cases was not feasible because of the
format in which models were presented. Although
most of the models reviewed claimed to have
based their projections on disaggregated com-
modities and countries or regions, the models are
often presented in an aggregated format. This
makes consistent comparisons across models
difficult because each model has its own unique
set of aggregations.
With respect to the aggregation by com-
modity, it is typical to produce projections by com-
modity (for example, wheat, coarse grains, and
rice) and then aggregate them as cereals (for ex-
ample by adding up the three mentioned com-
modities) or grains (that is, wheat plus coarse
grains). The aggregation called “food” used by
IFPRI (IFPRI 1977; Paulino 1986) changed over
time. In the 1977 work, IFPRI defines food as
cereals, roots and tubers, and pulses; in 1986,
IFPRI added cassava and plantains to the previous
definition. This way of aggregating makes projec-
tions produced by IFPRI not comparable with other
projections made to 1990 and 2000.
The different coverage of countries also
proved to be a major difficulty in making effective17
comparisons. Models have evolved over time,
incorporating more countries, as better data
became available. Whenever the presentation
included country-level information, we built homo-
geneous regions for both projections and actual
data to make the appropriate comparisons. In
other cases, when the information was reported as
aggregated figures, we had to build the com-
parison table to match that aggregation. For in-
stance, in the case of FAO, projections made in
1979 to the 1985 period are presented only as
regional aggregates; since the other FAO pro-
jections were presented at a country level, it was
possible with effort to replicate the 1979 regional
aggregates for the comparison.
Discrepancies in the data source used were
another cause of divergence. Two main data-
bases are used for agricultural statistics: the FAO
database (FAOSTAT) and the USDA (PS&D) data-
base. For wheat, both databases show similar
figures (with the exception of the information for
some countries such as the USSR and China); in
the case of coarse grains, however, FAO uses a
larger number of coarse grains than USDA. In
addition, FAO reports paddy rice and USDA mil-
led rice. Because of this, we estimated the projec-
tion errors using the same underlying data as were
used in the projection. Thus, FAO projection errors
were constructed based on FAO current data,
whereas USDA projection errors were compared
with USDA data. For other agencies, we followed
the same methodology that they used in their stud-
ies; for instance, IFPRI (1977) mixed USDA data
on cereals (wheat, rice, and coarse grains) with
FAO data on roots and tubers and pulses, and
transformed the latter into cereal equivalents.
We chose to compare the most homogeneous
commodity possible when making comparisons
among agencies. Thus, when possible, we chose
to compare wheat projections rather than grain or
cereals projections.
In addition, to soften shocks from a particular
year and make the actual data more comparable
with the data used in the models, we averaged
three years of actual data centered on the projec-
tion year. Thus, for instance, the “actual” datum for
the year 1985 used in computing the projection
error is the average for the years 1984, 1985,
and 1986.
A final problem when comparing the models
is the number of years projected by the different
models. This problem could not be addressed be-
cause the models (with the exception of FAPRI’s
model) report results only for the final forecast year
and not for the intermediate years, so there is no
possibility of matching forecasts with different ter-
minal years using intermediate-year results of
other models.
Comparison of Food Balance
Projections within Agencies over
Time
We constructed three comparison tables to ana-
lyze FAO, USDA, and IFPRI performance in pro-
jecting consumption and production over time. Be-
cause of their size, we have placed the detailed
tables (which include projection errors as well as
the actual figures and projections) in Appendix 5;
here we present summary tables showing only the
projection errors. The heading “year1/year2”
denotes the year the projection was published
(year 1) and the projection year (year 2). We have
used the publication date instead of the base year
of the projection because of the lack of information
about what base year was actually used in many
of the projections analyzed. In any case, the
difference between the publication year and the
base year of the projection is normally not more
than a year or two.
Table 2 presents a comparison of projection
errors for FAO (details are provided in Appendix
5, Table 15). We compare wheat production and
consumption projections made in 1963 to 1970,
in 1967 to 1975, in 1971 to 1980, in 1979 to
1985, and in 1986 to 1990.
With respect to their accuracy over time, the
results for FAO show that aggregate projections
seem to become accurate over time. Thus, the
1986 projections to 1990 of world wheat produc-
tion and consumption show a small error (−1.3
and −0.3 percent, respectively). This also appears
to be true for their projections for developing and
developed countries when considered as an ag-
gregate. However, it is important to use caution in18














Production n.a. n.a. −18.9 −12.7 −10.8 −12.4 −11.1 −1.3
Consumption n.a. n.a. −36.6 −17.3 −15.0 −11.4 −9.8 −0.3
Production
Developing n.a. n.a. −33.3 −19.4 −15.2 −24.8 −16.1 −0.5
Latin America 4.5 3.6 −1.3 8.7 9.6 −6.0 5.0 10.3
Africa 23.6 58.7 −13.1 3.9 34.8 5.0 22.6 −23.1
Near East 8.5 11.3 −56.2 −43.3 −16.8 −2.2 4.9 −5.4
Far East −37.0 −17.2 −34.0 −3.5 −4.9 −20.8 −10.5 5.3
Asian CPE n.a. n.a. −33.9 −30.8 −32.6 −41.7 −34.7 −3.1
Developed n.a. n.a. −11.7 −9.2 −8.3 −4.1 −7.8 −2.0
North America 5.5 5.5 −12.9 −12.9 −30.6 −19.9 −34.9 4.4
Western Europe −3.0 −3.0 15.4 16.3 −12.6 −26.1 −25.7 −18.3
Eastern Europe and USSR n.a. n.a. −25.9 −20.6 11.8 29.0 33.6 1.0
Oceania −30.6 −30.6 −11.5 −11.5 −2.0 −19.0 −40.1 37.3
Consumption
Developing n.a. n.a. −47.3 −24.4 −23.4 −22.7 −19.7 −0.4
Latin America −1.0 5.3 −76.2 −12.2 −8.6 −3.3 1.5 22.8
Africa 27.4 43.8 −49.5 −28.9 −25.9 −13.9 −9.0 15.4
Near East −14.6 −12.1 −90.4 −49.1 −28.0 −17.0 −17.5 −1.0
Far East −9.9 3.2 −27.0 −15.1 −10.2 −9.2 −4.0 −1.0
Asian CPE n.a. n.a. −22.8 −19.7 −35.1 −41.3 −38.9 −7.9
Developed n.a. n.a. −28.7 −12.2 −7.6 0.8 0.8 −0.3
North America −10.5 −13.6 7.0 7.5 −14.0 −28.5 −31.1 −13.5
Western Europe −7.2 −7.7 −42.4 20.0 8.1 −14.7 −16.0 −7.4
Eastern Europe and USSR n.a. n.a. −32.3 −33.4 −13.0 17.2 18.7 6.2
Oceania −10.9 −10.9 −3.8 −4.4 5.1 14.8 10.5 4.8
Sources: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT Database. Projections are from FAO 1963, 1967, 1971, 1979, and 1986.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data used are three-year
averages centered in the reported year. A positive value indicates that the projection is an overestimate, a negative value an
underestimate. Shading is for ease of reading only.
n.a. = not available. CPE = centrally planned economies.
a Scenarios assuming low and high per capita income growth, respectively.
judging these results, since this last set of projec-
tions covers a projection interval considerably
shorter than the previous ones (four years ahead
against six to nine years ahead). Errors are higher
for earlier years where the projection interval is
longer. However, there appears to be a declining
trend in global errors.
With respect to how well FAO forecasts pro-
duction and consumption at the global level, we
find that FAO projections systematically tend to
underestimate both production and consumption.
This is also true when we observe projections at
the disaggregated levels of developed and devel-
oping countries (the one exception to this is the
consumption projection for developed countries
made in 1979 for 1985). Also note that, at even
more disaggregated levels, the errors are substan-
tially higher than those observed at the global
level, and they seem to increase the smaller is the
region. For instance, projections for Africa contain
substantial errors, with both over- and under-
estimates being high. This type of error seems asso-
ciated with data quality and the fact that, at a more
disaggregated level, country-specific shocks are
more important but they cannot be forecast. Fi-
nally, African production of wheat is small relative
to other regions, which would contribute to larger
percentage errors. It is interesting to note that,19
whereas projections for regions such as the Near
East, the Far East, and the Asian centrally planned
economies (Asian CPE) show some evidence of
declining errors over time, this is not the case for
Latin America because it has higher projection
errors at the end of the period (10.3 percent for
production and 22.8 percent for consumption). It
is often argued that poor data quality explains
larger errors in developing regions. However, the
errors in projections for both North America and
Western Europe (regions assumed to have good-
quality data) are also substantial. In these cases,
the effects of domestic commodity policy may be a
more important factor.
It should be pointed out that, when there are
scenarios accompanying the baseline projections
(1967/1975 and 1979/1985), the scenarios do
not necessarily encompass the full range of values
the projected variables could take. Thus, for in-
stance, at a global level both FAO scenarios under-
estimate production and consumption. This is be-
cause the high and low values of the exogenous
variables used to create the scenarios (for exam-
ple, per capita income) are also subject to errors,
and these errors are reflected in the projection of
the endogenous variables (for example, consump-
tion). This point is important because it reminds us
how dependent these world projection models are
on exogenous projections of nonagricultural vari-
ables such as exchange rates, nonagricultural
prices, nonagricultural output, population, per
capita income, and GNP growth, to name a few.
Projection errors over time for USDA are pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 4. In Table 3, we evaluate
wheat projections made in 1961 to 1962 and to
1966, in 1964 to 1970, in 1971 to 1980, in
1978 to 1985. In Table 4, we evaluate the base-
line wheat projections made by USDA in 1987 to
1990, 1995, and 2000 as published in Liu and
Seeley (1987). The full data sets are provided in
Appendix 5 (Tables 16 and 17). We present the
1987 projections in a separate table because
they are projections of demand for and supply of
wheat, instead of consumption and production
(that is, they include projections of wheat stocks),
and because they represent only a subset of
countries.
Looking at Table 3, several things seem clear.
First, in terms of accuracy over time, projection
errors tend to increase, with projections made to
1985 having higher errors than earlier projec-
tions. This is particularly true for production. Sec-
ond, projections consistently underestimate both
production and consumption. In fact, only sce-
nario II-A (see 1971/1985 projection) slightly
overestimates both production and consumption;
all the others underestimate them. Third, at a more
disaggregated level, the errors are less systematic
and much higher for some regions. Fourth, among
developed regions, projections for Western Euro-
pean production are underestimated for all peri-
ods (with substantial errors in the 1978/1985
projections). These results suggest a problem
of incorporating agricultural policies into the
models. Similarly, the results for North America,
which we might expect to be more accurate, show
that errors are not only high but also non-
systematic. For instance, projections to 1980 in
most of the scenarios substantially overestimate
U.S. consumption whereas the next projections to
1985 switch to significantly underestimating U.S.
consumption. On the other hand, U.S. production
is almost always underestimated.
With respect to projections for developing
countries, they seem to follow an established
pattern—the smaller the country/region, the
worse the projection. The clearest examples are
for Central and East Africa. Even in the case of
Latin America, one needs to look beneath the rela-
tively small errors at the regional level because
they are large offsetting errors for the subregions.
North Latin America, Central America, and the
Caribbean are significantly underestimated,
whereas South Latin America is overestimated.
In Table 4, we present the errors for supply and
demand projections to 1990, 1995, and 2000,
published by USDA in 1987. These projections
include changes in stocks. The errors in projection
are high compared with earlier projections, which
considered only production and consumption.
This suggests difficulties in forecasting long-term
stock movements. Note that, whereas the EC-10
countries are underestimated (both supply and de-
mand), almost all other projections are overesti-20









I II II-A II-B III
1978/1985b
I II III IV
Aggregatec
Production −5.1 −9.5 −13.6 −16.7 −6.7 0.1 −3.0 −24.9 −15.8 −11.1 −19.1 −9.1
Consumption −4.1 −7.0 −13.5 −11.9 −6.1 2.9 −0.4 −16.9 −9.4 −4.2 −12.4 −4.3
Production
North America −5.5 −22.0 7.0 −28.7 −30.3 −3.6 −12.6 −27.5 −9.1 10.9 −26.0 −1.1
Canada −6.8 −26.8 15.1 −8.9 −13.8 34.1 19.0 −5.5 −15.2 −3.1 −23.2 −11.6
United States −5.0 −19.6 4.2 −34.8 −35.4 −15.3 −22.4 −34.3 −6.7 16.5 −27.0 3.0
Western Europe −3.7 −10.5 −25.9 −18.6 −18.9 −20.3 −24.1 −18.6 −34.9 −41.3 −27.8 −43.4
Africa and Middle Eastd 1.9 −0.1 −3.4 −19.9 −11.6 −13.5 −12.0 −24.9 3.8 6.7 2.5 21.4
North Africa and Middle East 5.8 3.9 3.7 −18.8 −10.1 −11.1 −10.4 −24.8 3.2 5.7 2.0 22.1
Central Africae − − − −−−−−−−−−
East Africa −86.0 −88.5 −85.1 −24.9 −15.5 −15.5 −15.5 −15.5 −52.4 −50.5 −53.4 −44.4
South Africa −12.1 −1.4 −35.8 −33.8 −33.8 −49.1 −33.8 −33.8 9.4 17.9 5.0 11.6
India −7.8 14.6 −33.3 −6.6 20.9 20.9 20.9 −28.6 −12.4 −12.0 −12.4 2.6
Latin America and
Caribbean
1.1 7.2 8.5 8.2 20.3 9.6 13.6 −3.8 −16.0 −9.9 −19.9 −7.5
Upper Latin America and
Caribbean
−10.0 −11.5 13.4 18.5 48.1 44.4 44.4 −0.0 −37.1 −32.6 −39.3 −24.2
Lower Latin America 3.1 11.4 7.4 6.0 14.1 1.9 6.8 −4.6 −10.3 −3.8 −14.8 −3.0
Consumption
North America 1.8 −2.6 −1.2 −1.4 8.9 46.1 26.2 −8.8 −16.5 −17.6 −18.0 −14.2
Canada 15.9 12.8 28.5 −18.8 −11.2 77.6 39.8 −24.4 2.9 4.3 0.2 6.3
United States −1.6 −6.2 −7.6 2.8 13.8 38.4 22.9 −5.0 −20.1 −21.7 −21.4 −18.0
Western Europe −3.9 −5.3 −19.2 −8.1 −5.8 1.8 1.5 −9.9 −11.6 −9.5 −14.8 −7.7
Africa and Middle Eastd −0.6 −5.2 −3.8 −15.0 −9.3 −8.3 −9.7 −19.4 −8.3 −3.5 −11.1 −6.4
North Africa and Middle East −1.6 −6.0 −3.7 −18.1 −12.5 −11.9 −12.1 −21.4 −9.7 −6.9 −12.5 −7.9
Central Africae — — — —————————
East Africa −69.5 −71.0 −55.0 −17.6 −12.1 −6.6 −6.6 −23.1 −58.8 −19.2 −59.6 −57.7
South Africa 4.7 −9.5 3.8 −6.8 −6.8 −1.7 −32.7 −32.7 −4.7 −4.2 −5.8 −4.0
India −3.2 −4.4 −15.7 −13.4 −0.5 1.7 0.6 −18.1 −6.4 10.4 −10.8 8.9
Latin America and
Caribbean
3.7 0.7 −6.1 −2.5 −8.4 5.6 4.3 −16.0 −1.4 1.7 −3.4 1.1
Upper Latin America and
Caribbean
−3.7 −12.0 −16.0 −8.8 −33.7 6.1 4.5 −55.2 −27.6 −22.8 −30.9 −22.8
Lower Latin America 5.8 4.5 −3.1 −0.1 1.1 5.5 4.2 −1.4 9.9 12.2 8.4 11.4
Sources: Actual data are from the USDA PS&D Database. Projections are from Rojko et al. 1978. Shading is for ease of reading only.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data used are three-year averages
centered in the reported year. A positive value indicates that the projection is an overestimate, a negative value an underestimate.
Shading is for ease of reading only.
a I = Continuation of policies and moderate gain in productivity in developing countries. II = Higher productivity and economic growth than in I in
developing countries. II-A = Major exporters maintain their share in the world grain market. II-B = Major developed importers adjust their domes-
tic prices with international prices. III = Lower agricultural production and economic growth in developing countries than in scenario I.
b I = Continuation of the trend in terms of economic growth and policies. II = High economic growth that leads to higher level of imports. III = Low
income growth that reduces import demand. IV = Moderately higher productivity in developing countries in the context of high income growth
and strong world import demand.
c Error computed considering only the countries presented in the table (that is, not the entire world).
d Includes only those countries considered in the projection.
e Greater than 100 percent.
mated. Finally, we note that for North America
(Canada and the United States) errors in supply
projection errors are very high compared with
demand projection errors. We do not have a good
explanation for these large discrepancies.
Table 5 presents food production projections
for a group of developing countries made by IFPRI
in 1977 to 1990, and in 1986 to 2000. More
detailed data are contained in Appendix 5 (Table
18). Demand projections were not considered be-21
Table 4—USDA projection errors:









Supply 2.4 22.5 22.3
Demand −2.4 21.2 22.1
United States
Supply 40.5 65.3 53.7
Demand 22.3 47.5 29.8
Canada
Supply 13.3 41.1 58.5
Demand 0.1 13.6 23.2
Australia and New Zealand
Supply 46.0 40.8 17.0
Demand 14.0 22.7 −13.6
Argentina
Supply 8.1 9.3 −6.0
Demand −2.6 3.9 19.4
EC-10
Supply −26.7 −23.0 −29.2
Demand −24.9 −26.4 −34.2
Japan
Supply 14.9 100.4 120.4
Demand 12.7 22.8 34.5
USSR
Supply −10.6 22.9 44.1
Demand −3.8 51.6 89.6
Brazil
Supply 0.4 64.1 101.7 
Demand 34.5 27.2 18.4
Mexico
Supply −9.9 12.6 38.1
Demand 18.2 16.7 22.0
Sources: Actual data are from the USDA PS&D Database.
Projections are baseline projections from Liu and
Seeley 1987.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond
to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data
used are three-year averages centered in the reported
year. A positive value indicates that the projection is
an overestimate, a negative value an underestimate.
Supply includes beginning of year stocks and demand
includes end of year stocks.
a It considers only those regions and countries projected.
cause they were normative (that is, to satisfy re-
quirements). IFPRI’s trend supply projections typify
a frequent outcome: the aggregate projection ap-
pears to be very accurate but the components
have substantial offsetting errors. At the aggre-
gate level (that is, all the developing countries in
the study) the projection errors are quite small (0.1
Table 5—IFPRI projection errors: Food






Developing countries 0.1 2.6
Asia −6.5 0.6
Chinaa 41.4 −1.7
South Asia −9.4 0.3
East and South East Asia −0.5 7.0
North Africa/Middle East −15.2 13.8
Northern Africa −1.5 −2.2
Western Asia −22.3 20.7
Sub-Saharan Africa −3.8 −20.0
West Africa −20.0 −51.0
Central Africa 68.0 29.8
Eastern and Southern Africa −8.7 12.2
Latin America 31.8 29.1
Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean 37.3 51.5
Upper South America 22.9 27.0
Lower South America 45.3 13.0
Sources: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT and USDA PS&D
databases. Projections are from IFPRI 1977 and
Paulino 1986.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond
to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data
used are three-year averages centered in the reported
year. A positive value indicates that the projection is
an overestimate, a negative value an underestimate.
a Only Taiwan for 1990; Taiwan plus People’s Republic of China
for 2000.
and 2.6 percent). However, at the regional level
in, for example, the 1990 projections, three
regions—Asia, North Africa/Middle East, and
Sub-Saharan Africa—are underestimated, while
Latin America overshot by 32 percent. Similarly,
within regions (for example, Sub-Saharan Africa)
larger subregional errors in both directions par-
tially offset each other. It is not the intent to single
out IFPRI; rather we use IFPRI results to illustrate a
very common characteristic of most projections as
they are disaggregated.
Comparing the results obtained from the anal-
ysis of projections made over time by the three
agencies, we postulate some conclusions:
1. Global projections are generally more ac-
curate than projections of more disaggre-
gated regions, subregions, and countries.
2. Generally, the smaller the country or
the region, the higher are the projection22
errors. Africa’s projections are the typical
case, and we attribute this result to data prob-
lems and the presence of many shocks specific
to small countries.
3. At least in the cases of FAO and USDA,
projections consistently seem to underestimate
global production and consumption.
4. We were surprised at the size of errors in
projecting production and consumption for
developed countries, especially in the cases of
Western Europe and the United States, where
data problems should not be an issue. We
hypothesize that these outcomes reflect the
difficulty of incorporating complex domestic
policies into the analysis.
5. We hypothesized that agencies doing
many projections sequentially over time
should learn and improve their accuracy.
There is some evidence to support this hypoth-
esis with respect to FAO. However, the op-
posite appears to be the case for USDA.









Consumption 6.7 −2.9 1.5 −5.8 3.1 −8.0 −0.7
Production n.a. −5.9 −1.6 −8.7 −0.1 −5.8 −5.8
Developed countries
Consumption 2.9 14.3 19.0 9.8 20.1 −25.9 20.9
Production n.a. 4.4 10.5 −0.2 5.2 −4.7 −4.7
Developing countries
Consumption 10.2 −18.1 −14.0 −19.6 −11.9 n.a. n.a.
Production 9.8 −17.7 −15.6 −18.5 −6.2 n.a. n.a.
Developing market economies
Consumption 22.0 −10.9 −4.7 −13.3 −1.7 31.8 48.9
Production 36.7 −10.1 −6.7 −11.4 8.6 −7.6 −7.6
Asian centrally plannedc
Consumption −8.3 −30.9 −30.3 −30.8 −30.0 n.a. n.a.
Production −18.4 −29.8 −29.8 −29.8 −29.8 n.a. n.a.
Sources: FAO data are from the FAOSTAT database and USDA data are from the USDA PS&D database. Projections are from USDA
1974.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data used are three-year
averages centered in the reported year. A positive value indicates that the projection is an overestimate, a negative value an
underestimate. ISU = Iowa State University. Shading is for ease of reading only.
a I = Assumes initial slow growth, but resumed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. II = Assumes high world demand situation. III =
Assumes low demand and stagnation. IV = Assumes faster growth of production in developing countries.
b Iowa State assumes high (H) and low (L) scenarios for demand resulting in two possible balances.
c FAO includes China, People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, and Vietnam; USDA includes only China.
Comparison of Food Balance
Projections across Agencies for the
Same Year
We constructed three tables for comparisons
across agencies. Table 6 presents cereal projec-
tions by FAO, USDA, and Iowa State University
(ISU) made in about 1974 to the forecast year of
1985; Table 7 evaluates wheat projections by
FAO and FAPRI made around 1985 to the forecast
year of 1990; and Table 8 reviews cereal projec-
tions made in the mid-1990s by FAO, IFPRI,
USDA, and the World Bank to forecast year
2000. Parallel detailed data are given in Appen-
dix 5 (Tables 19, 20, and 21).
First, supporting our earlier analysis, global
projection errors are consistently smaller than
those at a more disaggregated level. Therefore,
the global aggregate alone is likely to be a poor
indicator of the accuracy of the model. The ISU
results in Table 6 illustrate this clearly in the low-
growth scenario where the underestimate of con-23
Table 7—FAO and FAPRI wheat











United States 16.3 13.6





United States −13.2 −12.8
USSR −2.5 −0.7
Sources: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT database. FAPRI
projections are from Meyers, Devadoss, and Helmar
1986; FAO projections are from FAO 1986.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond
to “publication year/projection year.” Actual data
used are three-year averages centered in the reported
year. A positive value indicates that the projection is
an overestimate, a negative value an underestimate.
sumption in developed countries (25.9 percent)
almost offsets a significant overestimate of con-
sumption in developing market economies (31.8
percent). Reference to Table 19 shows that this is
also true in absolute terms. Second, both USDA
and ISU underestimate production at the global
level. In the case of USDA, this result is due to
underestimates of production in developing coun-
tries only, whereas for ISU it is due to under-
estimates of production in both developed and
developing countries. Third, comparing the pro-
jections made for developing countries by FAO
and USDA, USDA (in all variants) underestimates
both production and consumption in developing
countries, whereas FAO overestimates them.
Fourth, most of the USDA underestimation prob-
lems in developing countries come from the
errors generated by large underestimates of both
consumption and production in Asian centrally
planned economies. This likely reflects diffi-
culties in projecting Chinese production and
consumption.
Table 7 presents projections to 1990 by FAO
and FAPRI, both made around 1985 and both
using world nonspatial trade models (in the case
of FAO, the projections obtained from the model
are further adjusted by FAO experts). The projec-
tion errors observed in both cases are quite similar
and both agencies underestimate production and
consumption. As in the previous analysis, the small
global errors cover up larger offsetting errors at
the country level. Both have real problems in
projecting North American and EC-10 production
and consumption. In the case of the United States,
both agencies overestimate its production by well
over 10 percent, while Canadian production is
underestimated by some 20 percent. In addition,
North American consumption is significantly
underestimated.
Table 8 displays the calculated projection er-
rors from cereal projections made by FAO, IFPRI,
USDA, and the World Bank to 2000 based on
nonspatial world trade models. The data used to
calculate the errors are contained in Appendix
Table 21. In the case of IFPRI, we consider
projections from two models: the IFPTSIM (Ag-
caoili and Rosegrant 1995) and the IMPACT
model (Rosegrant, Agcaoili-Sombilla, and Perez
1995). These two models are similar in construc-
tion, the main difference being that IMPACT con-
tains many updated elasticity values. In the case of
the IMPACT model we present two projections: the
first one, called interpolation, was computed by
applying the projected annual growth rates for the
period 1990–2020 to the period 1990–2000,
in order to calculate the 2000 figure. The second
IMPACT projection was generated by running the
original IMPACT model to the year 2000. Unfortu-
nately, it was not possible to compute the errors for
projections about consumption for the models
using FAO data, because these were not yet
available.
It is important to note that in the absence of
actual 2001 data, the errors in Table 8 were com-
puted using actual figures only for 1999 and
2000, instead of the three-year centered average
used in our analysis of projections to years earlier
than 2000. This was necessary because most of
the models reviewed provide a projection only for24

















Production 8.9 8.9 6.8 7.3 5.9 2.8
Consumption n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5 2.6
Production
Developed countries 10.8 20.0 10.6 9.9 8.2 5.9
Eastern Europe and
former USSR
54.0 67.1 47.2 45.4 47.6 20.7
Developing countries 7.3 −0.3 3.3 5.1 4.0 0.3
Latin America 3.8 −2.5 −0.1 −5.7 −4.8 −2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.1 −3.2 3.2 1.4 41.3 8.0
Asia 4.3 −3.1 −0.1 2.2 −0.9 0.3
Middle East/North Africa 44.5 36.1 37.6 44.7 33.0 −2.3
Consumption
Developed countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8 1.6
Eastern Europe and
former USSR
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 43.9 20.7
Developing countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.6 3.3
Latin America n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. −4.9 −4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.0 1.6
Asia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 9.3
Middle East/North Africa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.3 −20.4
Sources: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT and USDA PS&D databases. Projections are from FAO (1994), IFPRI [IFPTSIM results are
from Agcaoili and Rosegrant (1995); IMPACT results are from Mark Rosegrant (private communication, 2001)], World Bank
(Mitchell, Ingco, and Duncan 1997), and USDA (1997). The structures of the IFPTSIM and IMPACT models are similar; the
main difference is that IMPACT includes many updated elasticities.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond to “publication year/projection year.” Actual figures used to compute
the errors are only the average of 1999 and 2000 figures in the absence of the 2001 figure. A positive value indicates that the
projection is an overstimate, a negative value an underestimate. Shading is for ease of reading only.
n.a. = not available.
aPublication year corresponds to the model version, since the figures have not been published before.
bPublication year corresponds to the year when the figures were originally published.
the year 2000. Therefore we did not have the
option of using a 1998–2000 three-year cen-
tered average. However, given that all models
were treated the same way, the analysis still pro-
vides valid comparisons.
These projections, published in the mid-
1990s, have as many similarities as they have
differences. This is yet another case where the
aggregate results are more accurate than the com-
ponents that make them up. All the projections
overestimate global production, as they do the
production of developed and developing coun-
tries. The one exception is IFPTSIM, which slightly
underestimates developing-country production.
First, we analyzed production projections
where we could compute errors for all the models.
In the case of developed countries, IFPRI’s IFPTSIM
model has the highest projection error (20.0 per-
cent), followed by FAO (10.8 percent), IFPRI’s IM-
PACT (10.6 and 9.9 percent), and World Bank
(8.2 percent). USDA’s projection error is the
lowest (5.9 percent); however, this model also has
the shortest projection horizon of 3 years. In the
case of developing countries, FAO has the highest25
error (7.3 percent) followed by IFPRI’s IMPACT
“dynamic run” projection (5.1 percent), World
Bank (4.0 percent), and IFPRI’s IMPACT “inter-
polation” projection (3.3 percent). IFPRI’s IFPTSIM
and USDA have the lowest errors (–0.3 and 0.3
percent, respectively).
Second, we looked at regional components
of the two large country blocks (developed and
developing) and noticed, as in our previous analy-
sis, that the errors seem to worsen at this level. In
general, all the models have difficulty projecting
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, for both
production and consumption. This may illustrate
that mathematical trade models have difficulty in
reflecting a rapidly changing (deteriorating) eco-
nomic situation. It is likely, however, that older
trend projection models would have had even
worse results than the trade models. In addition,
all of the models, except USDA’s projection for
production, show large overestimates for the
Middle East/NorthAfrica region. (For produc-
tion, the errors go from the World Bank with
33.0 percent to IFPRI’s dynamic run with 44.7 per-
cent; for consumption, the World Bank projection
error is 17.3 percent and USDA’s is –20.4 per-
cent.) The World Bank substantially overestimates
Sub-Saharan African production (41.3 percent).
Latin America and Asia in general show errors
below 5 percent, although some models overesti-
mate the actual figure and others underestimate
it.
In concluding this review across models, we
find that modest projection errors at the global
level often hide larger errors when we analyze the
projections of the component parts. The proposi-
tion that the smaller the country or region, the
worse the projection seems to be supported when
looking across models. Finally, the analysis identi-
fies data problems as a major cause of error. This
suggests the need for increased attention to ob-
taining better data if modelers are interested in
producing better projections, especially for
developing countries. For developed countries,
the major issue seems to be modeling complicated
domestic policies, including quantitative border
restrictions.26
4. Evaluation of Surveys, Scenarios, and
Predictions about the Food Situation and
Resource Constraints
In this chapter we evaluate the remainder of the
literature surveyed. We start by reviewing popula-
tion versus food supply predictions. This review
looks at the nutritional needs-based surveys of
FAO and USDA; appraises a number of generally
pessimistic predictions made in the 1960s and
1970s and in the late 1980s and 1990s about
population growth and famine; and briefly looks
at Club of Rome models. The second part of the
chapter reviews selected predictions—both nega-
tive and positive—about energy, water, and land,
as well as fisheries. The chapter closes with a
comment on poverty and income distribution
issues.
Population versus Food Supply
In this section we discuss three related topics: early
food needs surveys, qualitative predictions, and
global simulation models.
Nutritional Needs and Food Supply
Constraints
Immediately following World War II there was a
great deal of uncertainty about whether there
would be food shortages or surpluses. It was in this
context that FAO undertook the first of six World
food surveys. Given the complete breakdown of
statistics during the war, the approach used was to
estimate a baseline of pre-war calorie avail-
abilities and compare them with postulated mini-
mum nutritional standards. The baseline conclu-
sion was that over half of the world’s population
had access to less than 2,250 calories per day,
one-third had access to more than 2,750 calories
per day, and the remainder were in between.
Thus, between half and two-thirds of the world
population were undernourished before the war.
The analysis concluded that things were worse
after the war. FAO then formulated minimum post-
war nutritional targets and from them computed
the production required to feed all to a minimum
standard. This analysis suggested the need for
greatly expanded production. Recognizing that
production increases of that magnitude would
take time, the year 1960 was selected as the
“planning year.” The sum of the amount of food
needed to feed the existing population properly,
and the additional needs of the 25 percent
projected population increase, provided some
startling numbers regarding required increases in
production—cereals 25 percent, roots and tubers
27 percent, pulses 80 percent, fruits and vegeta-
bles 163 percent, meat 46 percent, and milk 100
percent. The remainder of the slender report
discussed, in very general terms, the possibilities
for production increases. The conclusion was dis-
tinctly Malthusian: more than half the world was
undernourished, massive increases in food pro-
duction would be required to feed them, and there
was obvious pessimism about meeting the target.
The Second world food survey completed in
1952 presented an even more alarming picture.
Using still fragmentary data on food availability,
the first conclusion was that the situation had wors-
ened since the 1946 survey. By preparing food
availability budgets for some but not all countries,27
FAO estimated acreage, yields, and production.
Adjusting for losses and seed and feed utilization,
per capita availability was estimated by country.
By aggregating across countries, world output
was estimated. Output of all grains, except for
maize, was still, in 1949–51, below pre-war lev-
els, as was production of potatoes and pulses.
Only sugar and maize had an index exceeding
100. Comparing these per capita supplies with
updated nutritional standards led to the conclu-
sion, based on a standard of 2,600 calories/
capita/day, that over two-thirds of the world’s
population was undernourished. This represented
a deterioration from 1946.
Using the nutrition targets to compute the addi-
tional supplies needed to bring everyone up to
2,600 calories, plus the needs for the estimated
increase in population, yielded the food “gap” for
1960. Converting the gap into required rates of
increases in production allowed comparison
against recent actual experience. The required
rates of production growth were in most cases 50
percent above the post-war recovery rate, which
led to the conclusion that “viewed in this light the
prospects are not at first sight promising” (FAO
1952, 26).
The Third world food survey was published in
1963. It followed a generally similar approach,
only now food supply balance sheets were com-
puted for many more countries. Nutritional re-
quirements were adjusted by country and region,
and then compared with food availability. The
results were that the situation was better than the
immediate post-war period, but only slightly
above the pre-war situation. The conclusion, less
startling than before but still dire, was that “10–15
percent of [the world’s] people are under-
nourished and up to a half suffer from hunger or
malnutrition or both” (FAO 1963, 9). Projecting to
1975, food supplies would need to increase 35
percent to sustain the “present unsatisfactory diet”
(FAO 1963, 9). For all to be up to minimum levels
of nutrition, world food supplies would need to
increase by 50 percent.
In a critique of analyses of the world food
situation, Thomas Poleman (1975) is very critical
of FAO for approaching world food issues with a
strong Malthusian bias. He similarly lumps the
USDA’s first foray into global food security analy-
sis,  The world food budget, 1962 and 1966
(USDA 1961), in the same category. The study
concluded that two-thirds of the world (that is, 1.9
billion people) had diets that were “nutritionally
inadequate, with shortages in protein, fat, and
calories” and, further, that there was “no likeli-
hood that the food problem soon will be solved”
(USDA 1961, 5).
The approach used by both FAO and USDA
necessarily underestimated food availability and
overestimates needs. It underestimated production
because of incomplete country coverage. It over-
estimated needs because it assumed that the
needs for every human were the same. Further, the
levels of nutritional requirements specified were
higher than later analysis suggested was neces-
sary. Subsequent to these “normative” analyses,
both FAO and USDA initiated parallel positive
projections of supply and demand, which we
have already discussed in Chapter 3. FAO con-
tinued to produce the World food survey periodi-
cally in 1977, 1987, and in 1996. Calculations
continued to be made of the number of under-
nourished people in the world. Following the
downward adjustment of protein requirements in
the 1970s, the numbers dropped. Between the
fifth and sixth surveys, absolute numbers dropped
marginally from over 900 million to 841 million
and the share of the population undernourished
dropped substantially. There has continued to be
controversy about how to measure hunger; Uvin




FAO and USDA were not the only ones concerned
about food security in the 1960s and the early
1970s. The demographic transition from high
birth and death rates to low birth and death rates
was proceeding unevenly. Death rates were drop-
ping and life expectancy increasing, but birth
rates remained high. The result was rates of in-
crease in population never before experienced in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Concern about28
the capacity of the world to feed burgeoning num-
bers emerged from outside the traditional food
and agriculture establishment. William and Paul
Paddock first expressed concern in their book
Hungry nations published in 1964. The book con-
tains a sequence of examples of poverty and un-
dernourishment in the recently independent coun-
tries of the developing world. Two bad monsoons
in South Asia (India) in 1965 and 1966, and the
subsequent massive shipments of food aid (30
million tons), which staved off famine, triggered
further pessimism. Lester Brown and USDA ex-
pressed the view that the capacity of U.S. agricul-
ture to save the world from future larger shortfalls
would be problematic after the middle 1980s
(Brown 1970). The Paddock brothers’ second
book—Famine 1975!—predicted just that: “in fif-
teen years the famines will be catastrophic” (Pad-
dock and Paddock 1967, 18).
After two years of falling per capita food sup-
plies (1965–66), however, per capita food avail-
ability was again rising, more rapidly now be-
cause the Green Revolution was gaining strength.
Lester Brown was cautiously optimistic in Seeds of
change (1970) and Colin Clark (1970) was very
optimistic—the world should be able to feed 35
billion, ten times the then population.
But, if food and agricultural people were be-
coming more optimistic, ecologists and demogra-
phers were not. Paul Ehrlich predicted massive
and long-term famines in The population bomb
(1970). The Club of Rome produced the first of
three studies (Meadows et al. 1972) that pre-
dicted the exhaustion of many nonrenewable nat-
ural resources, with serious consequences for food
security.
Growing optimism about improved global
food prospects was suspended by the doubling
and tripling of grain prices in 1972–74. Lester
Brown became more pessimistic, publishing By
bread alone in 1974. The Paddock brothers re-
issued Famine 1975! as Time of famines in 1976.
Pessimism persisted for some in the late 1970s
with The Global 2000 report in 1980 (Barney
1980–81). But optimism returned with D. Gale
Johnson’s book World food problems and pros-
pects (1975).
By the late 1980s and early 1990s sporadic
dire predictions began to surface again: Brown
(1988); Ehrlich and Ehrlich, The population explo-
sion (1990); Postel, Last oasis (1992); Brown and
Kane, Full house (1994); and Brown, Who will
feed China? (1995). Most of these new concerns
were focusing on natural resources constraints
and on the depletion of fisheries. We look ex-
plicitly at these resource issues in the last section of
this chapter.
Finally, there are some who attribute persistent
world hunger and undernutrition not to supply and
population issues at all, but to the unequal distribu-
tion of resources and income and to the concentra-
tion of economic and political power in the hands
of the rich and the elite (Lapp´e, Collins, and
Rosset 1998). However, this is a topic for another
paper.
As the twentieth century ended, grain prices
were at a 100-year low, stocks were building, and
reasonable scholars were writing about Feeding
the ten billion (Evans 1998). Massive famines had
not occurred on the scale forecast by Ehrlich or the
Paddock brothers. Serious food insecurity did oc-
cur in a number of developing countries, but these
events were almost always associated with civil
strife, not with persistent food shortages. In fact,
Amartya Sen won a Nobel Prize, in part, for his
analytical conclusion that policy failure was the
cause of most famines (Sen 1981). He could find
no recent famines that originated with shortfalls of
food production. Lastly, D. Gale Johnson (1975)
has argued several times that the world is now
capable of moving fast enough to permanently
remove natural shortage-induced famines as a se-
rious issue.
Why then has the pessimistic view not been
generally confirmed? First, because most predic-
tors do not use formal models, they are free to
focus on a subset of variables that particularly
concern them—land loss, or water constraints, or
slow improvements in yield growth, and so on. As
more of these partial components turn negative,
there is a tendency to project them individually,
add up the partial sums, and see serious problems
ahead. In reality, however, these individual vari-
ables are part of a much larger complex of tightly29
interrelated variables, many of which have some
degree of substitution (trade-offs) among them. On
the other hand, using models rooted in historical
trends forces a broader and more integrated look
at the picture.
Second, widely publicized predictions inevita-
bly bring responses. Early projections of signifi-
cant long-term food gaps, made assuming con-
stant prices, never materialized because, as
shortages emerged, prices rose, producers re-
sponded positively, and consumers responded
negatively. The world, whether we like it or not, is
like a giant general equilibrium model. Some
have argued that Lester Brown’s book Who will
feed China? (1995), widely criticized for propos-
ing possible grain imports of between 280 and
369 million metric tons by 2030, nevertheless
intensified the debate about China’s long-term
food strategy.
Third, it may be that these authors are not
making predictions but rather producing pessimis-
tic scenarios with the explicit purpose of pushing
the policy process in particular directions. Ehrlich
discusses this strategy in The population bomb
(1970) and it is explicitly the objective of the Club
of Rome studies. What clearly are being made are
conditional forecasts, conditioned on variables
that particular authors are concerned about. Thus
their objective is to reduce the chances that their
predictions will come true.
Furthermore, most are predicting far enough
in advance that they expect no one will be around
to check up on them 50 years later. The one excep-
tion was the Paddock brothers, who re-released
Famine 1975! in 1976 when widespread famine
clearly had not occurred.
Finally, a word needs to be said about the
optimists. Although we have reviewed only a
small sample, it is clear that their optimism comes
from very different sources: Russell and Clark are
convinced that there are great unused soil re-
sources; Simon sees increased numbers of human
minds as the ultimate renewable resource; Evans
is optimistic about biological technology; and
Avery, Johnson, and Cochrane are all optimistic
about the power of science to increase agricultural
productivity. All, of course, have one thing in com-
mon: history has not yet proven them wrong.
If dire predictions seldom, if ever, come true
and optimistic predictions are not able to be tested,
are these qualitative prediction exercises of no
value? Models focus on regularities and historical
interdependencies. Most of the writers reviewed in
this section have focused on possible shocks that
could upset the regularities of the models. There-
fore, they could have significant impacts but, by
virtue of being exogenous, they are difficult to
predict. Further, many of these “shocks”—
resource depletion, price run-ups, and adverse
policy choice, as in the underinvestment in
research—are correctable by appropriate
policy/human choice. Therefore, negative/
doomsday scenarios, if based on critical variables
and reasoned analysis, may provide useful inputs
at critical stages in the policy debate. Of course, if
the prognosticator has frequently been wrong in
the past, the n + 1 prediction may have less impact.
Global Simulation Models of
Resource Constraints
We now turn to a class of global simulation models
that try to simulate the interrelationships between
population growth, food demand, natural re-
sources degradation, and food supply. They add
to more traditional supply and demand projec-
tions, the interrelationships between population
growth, environmental degradation, and natural
resource availability to project impacts on food
production. Traditional projection models treat
population as an exogenous variable and natural
resources as an exogenous constraint, if they are
considered at all. There are no feedback loops.
Examples of these global models are the
works initiated under the sponsorship of the Club
of Rome, including the models by Forrester
(1971), Meadows et al. (1972), the World Inte-
grated Model (Mesarovic and Pestel 1974), and
the Latin American World Model (Herrera 1976).
According to Fox and Ruttan (1984), who re-
viewed these global models, it is possible to in-
clude in this group the World Input/Output Model
formulated by Leontief, Carter, and Petri (1977)
for the United Nations, even if the characteristics
of this model differ substantially from the men-
tioned global models.30
The main motivation of these global models
was the apparent conflict between high growth
rates of population, expanded economic activity
and resource depletion in the post-war era, and
the finite resource capacity of the planet. Thus,
according to the first publication of the Club of
Rome, Limits to growth,
One [objective] was to gain insight into the limits of our
world system and the constraints it puts on human num-
bers and activity. Nowadays, more than ever before,
man tends toward continual . . . growth . . . blindly
assuming that his environment will permit such expan-
sion, that other groups will yield, or that science and
technology will remove the obstacles....  A  second
objective was to help identify and study the dominant
elements, and their interactions that influence the long-
term behavior of world systems....   Our goal was to
provide warnings of potential world crisis if these trends
are allowed to continue, and thus offer an opportunity
to make changes in our political, economic, and social
systems to ensure these crises do not take place.
(Meadows et al. 1972, 186)
The results of the initial models (that is, Forres-
ter’s and Meadows’ models) were severely crit-
icized in terms of their construction and assump-
tions, particularly their lack of empirical support
for the different relationships included in the
models. It was argued that this lack of empirical
basis would reduce the robustness of the predic-
tions formulated with the models.
Nordhaus (1973) pointed out three critical
weaknesses of the Limits to growth models. First,
the functional relationships used by Forrester in his
model were purely conjectural and not derived
from data or empirical studies. It is important to
note that correction of this weakness was tried by
Meadows in the subsequent models, but the re-
quirements in terms of information were quite
difficult to meet. Second, the models lacked an
economic framework that could serve as support
to the structure of the model. There was no price
system or any structure of incentives that could
guide resource use in response to increasing re-
source scarcity. Third, the results were not robust to
changes in the parameters of the model. In fact, by
slightly modifying the model assumptions, it was
possible to go from a doomsday prediction to just
the opposite conclusion.
As is noted by Fox and Ruttan (1984), the
criticisms of the initial Club of Rome models influ-
enced the subsequent global models (that is, Mes-
arovic and Pestel 1974; Herrera 1976), which
were formulated in a less aggregative way and
with a better economic structure. The functional
relationships in the models were also validated
empirically and the length of the projection period
was substantially reduced (ranging from 5 to 20
years). Although large general equilibrium global
simulation models are still alive (see Brecke
1993), most subsequent approaches continued to
consider these three components (that is, food sup-
ply and demand, natural resources, and popula-
tion) separately. The authors of the Limits to growth
(Meadows et al. 1972) did update their model,
and 20 years later published a new analysis en-
titled Beyond the limits. They used a simulation
model to analyze 13 scenarios about how differ-
ent population and environmental policies would
affect human well-being in the future. In addition,
comparing their current results with the original
ones, they found that, “in spite of the world’s im-
proved technologies, the greater awareness, the
stronger environment policies, many resource and
pollution flows had grown beyond their sustain-
able limits” (Meadows, Meadows, and Randers
1992, xiv).
Predictions about Resource and
Systems Constraints to Food
Security
In terms of natural resource constraints on ter-
restrial farming systems, our analysis is limited to
how selected resource stocks potentially constrain
food production. We briefly analyze constraints
related to energy, water, and land. Regarding
broader food system constraints, we consider pre-
dictions about fisheries as an additional source of
food. Finally, on the demand side, we briefly ana-
lyze poverty projections, because changes in the
incidence and distribution of poverty have im-
pacts on demand. Poverty implies a constraint in
terms of the affordability (access) of food and
therefore would have an impact on demand.
In the case of both natural resources and pov-
erty, a straightforward validation is not possible in31
every case because predictions are sporadic and
sometimes made for years beyond 2000. Our
methodology is, when possible, to compare the
prediction with the actual observed outcome. Thus
we were able to compare projections about land,
poverty, and fisheries with observed figures. If this
comparison was not possible, we compared the
key assumptions used to project the natural re-
source availability with the observed figures. This
was the case with energy. A third type of com-
parison was to compare older estimates of the
natural resource availability with the most recent
projections, which we assumed would be closer to
the actual figure. This method was applied for the
evaluation of earlier projections of fresh water
demand.
Some writers follow the practice of presenting
natural resources in per capita terms. Resources
such as land, oil, or water are generally finite and
do not grow. Therefore, when expressed in per
capita terms, they will always show a decreasing
trend. This in itself is not necessarily bad. What is
important is the capacity of those resources to
produce needed goods. To the extent they can be
used more efficiently or substitutes are found,
declining per capita availability should not be
alarming per se.
Energy
Is the world running low on energy resources,
particularly oil, that are needed to serve the in-
creasing population? This question is frequently
asked because shortages of petroleum (and high
prices) have implications for many dimensions of
food security. For food production, it affects the
supply and prices of fertilizers, fuel, and pesti-
cides, and fuel prices affect the processing and
transportation of food. There are two sides to the
debate. One side is represented by Lester Brown,
who in several publications has raised concerns
about decreases in per capita oil production. The
other side, for our purposes represented by Julian
Simon, presents a positive view of the energy
problem based on the existence of possible sub-
stitutes for oil. Brown’s position can be charac-
terized in the following quote from Resource
trends and population policy: a time for reassess-
ment.
If projected population growth materializes, a 1 per-
cent growth rate in oil production would lead to a
steady per capita decline. Between 1978 and 1990,
overall production would increase by some 12 percent
but production per person would fall from 5.23 barrels
to 4.66 barrels....  A s  oil reserves dwindle and as
more countries try to stretch out their remaining re-
serves, total oil production is likely to turn down around
1990, declining slowly from that point onward. As
overall output declines, production per person falls
rapidly, dropping from 4.66 barrels in 1990 to 3.55
barrels in 2000. Whether world oil production follows
the exact path projected here is not of overriding impor-
tance. What is important is not only that the period of
rapid growth in per capita oil output has ended but that
the oil produced per person at the end of the century
will be far less than it is today. (Brown 1979, 23)
Simon and Kahn take a more global view
about energy resources and permit the possibility
of substitution among different energy sources.
This position may be characterized by the follow-
ing quote taken from The resourceful earth.
The availability of energy has been increasing and the
meaningful cost has been decreasing, over the entire
span of humankind’s history. We expect this benign
trend to continue....   Barring extraordinary political
problems we expect the price of oil to go down. Even
with respect to oil, there is no basis to conclude that the
price will rise until the year 2000 and beyond....  B u t
no matter what the conditions, the market for oil sub-
stitutes probably constitutes a middle-run ceiling price
for oil not much above what it is now; there could be a
short-run panic run-up, but the world is better protected
from that now than in the 1970s. And if free competi-
tion prevails, the price will be far below its present level.
(Simon and Kahn 1984, 25)
Table 9 compares Brown’s (1979) projections
to 2000 with the most recent data. In terms of the
trend, production seems to be slightly increasing
not decreasing, as in Brown’s projections. Further-
more, this increase of production has kept the per
capita figure roughly constant.
On the other hand, Simon and Kahn’s predic-
tions about oil prices appear generally on track.
Figure 4 represents the evolution of oil prices from32






















1978 4.21 4.29 22.00 5.23 22.70 5.29
1980 4.37 4.44 22.30 5.10 22.60 5.09
1985 4.82 4.84 23.40 4.85 20.45 4.23
1990 5.28 5.27 24.60 4.66 23.19 4.40
1995 5.76 5.67 23.40 4.06 23.98 4.23
2000 6.25 6.07 22.20 3.55 25.30a 4.23a
Sources: Population projections are from United Nations 1979; oil projections are from Brown 1979. Actual population is from United
Nations 1998; oil data are from BP Amoco 2001.
aActual figures for production and production per capita are for 1999.
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US$ per barrel, 1982–84
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. government.
1946 to 2000 in 1982–84 dollars per barrel. As
shown, after reaching a peak in 1980, oil prices
seem to follow a decreasing trend, as predicted by
Simon, though there is a turn upward in 2000.
However, it is too early to tell whether this is a
reversal of trend or a temporary spike.
Brown’s projections about oil underestimated
future oil production. Thus, prices and per capita
supplies have not responded as sharply as he sug-
gests. This case is a good illustration of forecasting
a long-term future trend on a significant but short-
term perturbation (Brown used oil prices in 1978–
79) as opposed to using long-term trends (Simon
and Kahn used data from the period 1946–82).
Fresh Water
Fresh water is an important input in agriculture
and its scarcity could be a major constraint for
agricultural production. Predictions about the fu-
ture of fresh water resources again reflect at least
two different ways of looking at the reality. One
approach, used by Lester Brown, is to make pre-
dictions by extrapolating recent trends and leav-
ing little room for people to adjust to the scarcity of
the resource. According to Brown,
. . . in the final quarter of this century, the lack of fresh
water rather than land may be the principal constraint
on efforts to expand world food output. Indeed, in the33
Green Revolution countries, it is already the dominant
constraint on increasing the area planted on high-
yielding seeds....  Competition for water among
countries with common river systems has become in-
creasingly intense in the past two decades. (1974, 8)
On the other side, Simon and Kahn criticize
views about water in Barney’s Global 2000 re-
port (1980–81):
In the previous decade or so, water experts have con-
cluded that the “likelihood of the world running out of
water is zero.” The recent UN report of the World
Environment, for example, tells us not to focus upon the
ratio between physical water supply and use, as
Global 2000 does nevertheless, and emphasizes mak-
ing appropriate social and economic as well as tech-
nological choices. From this flows “cautious hope from
improved methods of management.” That is, an appro-
priate structure of property rights, institutions, and pric-
ing systems, together with some modicum of wisdom in
choosing among the technological options open to us,
can provide water for our growing needs at reasonable
cost indefinitely. (Simon and Kahn 1984, 24)
Lester Brown’s position is based on estimates
and projections to 2000 of fresh water availability
and use made by Shiklomanov (1993). Although
we have not been able to find actual observed
figures to compare with Shiklomanov’s projec-
tions, we found a more recent estimate of use
of fresh water made by the State Hydrological
Institute/UNESCO (1999), directed also by Shik-
lomanov, with projections to 2000. It is important
to note that, according to Shiklomanov, the projec-
tions are not very accurate, especially because of
the quality of the data. To evaluate the 1993
projections to 2000 we compare them with pro-
jections to 2000 published in 1999. We assume
that the more recent forecast can be regarded as a
better approximation of the actual figure. Thus, we
constructed Table 10, which presents the projec-
tion error in the 1993 forecast to 2000. A positive
value for this error implies that the earlier projec-
tion exceeded the more recent estimate of the total
use of water.
As shown in Table 10, projections made in
1993 to 2000 are consistently and significantly
higher than the 1999 to 2000 projections, imply-
ing that the 1993 projections used by Brown to








Withdrawal 3,250.0 2,605.0 24.8
Consumption 2,500.0 1,834.0 36.3
Industry
Withdrawal 1,280.0 776.0 64.9
Consumption 117.0 87.9 33.1
Municipal supply
Withdrawal 441.0 384.0 14.8
Consumption 64.5 52.8 22.2
Reservoirs
Both 220.0 208.0 5.8
Totalb
Withdrawal 5,190.0 3,973.0 30.6
Consumption 2,900.0 2,182.0 32.9
Sources: Shiklomanov 1993, SHI/UNESCO 1999.
Notes: “Year 1/Year 2” in the column headings correspond
to “publication year/projecting year.”
a Withdrawal stands for total water withdrawal; consumption
stands for irretrievable water loss.
b Total water use figures are rounded off.
support his conclusion have been adjusted down-
ward by the original author, Shiklomanov.
Land
The fears about land availability as a constraint to
feeding an increasing population can be traced
as far back as Malthus’s Essays on population. The
debate is still about whether a finite resource such
as land is or will become a constraint to meeting
future food needs. Again, we chose the writings of
Lester Brown to represent the thinking that it will be
difficult to add additional agricultural land to in-
crease food production.
There are essentially two ways of increasing the world
food supply from conventional agriculture. One is to
expand the area under cultivation. The other is to in-
crease output on the existing cultivated area. From the
beginning of agriculture until 1950, expanding the
cultivated area was the major means of increasing the
world’s food supply. Since that time, raising output on
the existing cultivated area has accounted for most of
the increase. An estimated four fifths of the annual rise
in the world food output achieved in the early seventies
was due to the intensification of cultivation....  A s34
human population growth has continued its steep as-
cent, the cropland per person has declined until today
there is only one acre for each of us. (Brown 1974, 76)
On the other side, we have those who con-
sider that yields can be substantially increased to
compensate for the slowing growth of rates of land
availability (Evans 1998). Clark (1970) repre-
sents the most optimistic view about the substantial
possibilities to expand production on new lands:
There still persists among some people the extra-
ordinarily erroneous idea that any further additions to
the world’s supply of agricultural land must be very
limited....   poor soils can be improved out of recogni-
tion by cultivation and fertilization; and it is assumed
that the world is willing to do this....   The potential
agricultural area of the world, it is seen, could provide
for the consumption, at these very high standards, of
35.1 billion people, or over 10 times the world’s pre-
sent population. (1970, 154–157)
Simon and Kahn address the issue that arable
land may be decreasing by erosion, thus implying
future constraints to food production. According to
them,
soil erosion is not occurring at a dangerous pace in
most parts of the United States, contrary to much recent
publicity. In most areas topsoil is not being lost at a rate
that makes broad changes in farming practices eco-
nomical from either the private or public standpoint,
though recent advances in tillage may change the pic-
ture somewhat. Regulating or subsidizing particular
tillage practices portends greater social cost than bene-
fit in the long run. (1984, 21)
To answer the question about agricultural land
growth or contraction, we present FAO data
(Table 11) showing the evolution of agricultural
land by use from 1985 to 1998. If there is any
trend, it seems to be that total agricultural area is
increasing very slowly, while arable land is static.
Of course, given population growth, per capita
availability will, by definition, be declining, but
this statistic by itself has little meaning.
In addition, in Table 12 we compare the
projections of irrigated cropland presented by the
Worldwatch Institute in the State of the world,
1990 with actual data, and compute the projec-
tion error. The projection slightly overestimates the












1985 4.81 0.11 3.34 1.37
1990 4.91 0.12 3.41 1.38
1995 4.93 0.13 3.42 1.38
1996 4.93 0.13 3.42 1.38
1997 4.93 0.13 3.42 1.38
1998 4.94 0.13 3.43 1.38
Source: FAOSTAT database (FAO 2001).
2000 figure by 2.8 percent. On the other hand, as
shown in the table, the actual growth rates of land
under irrigation are smoother than those pro-
jected, but in both cases the area of irrigated land
has been growing at decreasing rates.
Again, actual data to 2000 substantiate nei-
ther a rosy picture of increased availability nor a
pessimistic picture that land available for agricul-
ture production is declining. Further, as argued by
Evans, the real issue has to be sustaining or accel-
erating the rate of yield increases.
Fish
Fisheries are important because they represent a
major additional source of food. The debate on
fisheries is whether or not fish production can in-
crease to keep pace with the increasing demand
for food. Like previous projections, we note two
polar positions. On the more pessimistic side, we
have Lester Brown and Gerald Barney. According
to Lester Brown in Full house,
. . . we expect that the seafood catch in 2030 will be
roughly the same as in 1990. Uniformly good manage-
ment could raise this somewhat, but equally likely is a
continuation of the irresponsible management that is
now managing so many fisheries. This means that the
per capita seafood catch would drop from the historical
peak of more than 19 kilograms per person in 1990 to
11 kilograms per person in 2030. The effect this will
have on seafood prices deserves far more attention
than that is getting. (Brown and Kane 1995, 189)35














1960a 139 — 136 −− 2.2
1970 168 20.7 188 38.2 12.0
1980 210 25.0 236 25.5 12.5
1990 244 16.5 259 9.7 6.0
2000a 271 11.1 279 7.7 2.8
Sources: FAOSTAT database and Worldwatch Institute 1990.
Notes: An error with a negative sign indicates an underestimate.
a The actual value for 1960 was approximated with the 1961 value, and the 2000 value with the 1998 value.
Similar concerns can be observed in Barney’s
Global 2000 report to the President.
Unfortunately, the world harvest of fish is expected to
rise little, if at all, by the year 2000....   The world
catch of naturally produced fish leveled off in the 1970s
at about 70 million metric tons [mmt] a year (60 million
metric tons for marine fisheries, 10 million metric tons
for fresh water species). Harvests of traditional fisheries
are not likely to increase on a sustained basis....  I t
seems unlikely . . . that the generally accepted annual
potential of 100 mmt of traditional marine species will
be achieved on a sustained basis. It is more likely that
the potential is nearer the present catch, or about 60
mmt. (1980–81, 105)
On the “optimistic” side, Wise in his chapter
about the future of food from the sea in Simon and
Kahn’s  The resourceful earth (1984) gives a
different view about the future of fisheries.
What then can we say realistically about the prospects
of increased food supply from the sea by the year 2000
and beyond?
Production will probably continue to grow for the next
20 years at close to the present rates, which are equal
to, or higher than, the rate of human population
growth. It will reach the predicted 100–120 million
tons of conventional species around the turn of the
century.
If practical ways are found to fish the Antarctic krill and
to turn it into commercial products, total production
may well double. Other unconventional species may
make large contributions, and the possibility of dis-
covering ways to utilize species now used for fish meal
directly as human food offers the chance of yet another
large increase. Elimination of discards at sea, and
more efficient processing with less spoilage and wast-
age, could lead to substantial increases in food produc-
tion even without increases in fishing. It is evident that
tripling or even quadrupling the present level of produc-
tion of food from marine sources before the end of the
twenty-first century is a reasonable possibility. (1984,
123)
To address this issue we checked actual data
to determine whether a catch of 100 million metric
tons is a ceiling for the system. We have con-
structed Figure 5 based on the most recent data
from FAOSTAT about fish catch for the 1961–97
period. It is clear from the graph that 100 million
metric tons is not a limit; on the contrary, total catch
has surpassed that limit and kept growing. This, at
least until 2000, lends support to a more optimistic
view than that expressed by Barney.
Poverty
Poverty is a major constraint to food security be-
cause it limits access to food and therefore limits
the demand for food. The model presented in
Chapter 2 forecast total consumption/demand as
per capita consumption times population. The
model assumes that all the population can afford
the average per capita consumption, since it as-
sumes that everybody receives the average per
capita income. In reality, we know that is not true
and that income distribution is a relevant issue.
Furthermore, groups with different income levels
consume different combinations of goods, there-
fore the same commodity probably has a different
income elasticity for each income group.36









1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Million metric tons
Although it is theoretically feasible to incorpo-
rate the distribution of income into consumption
estimation, empirically it is quite challenging be-
cause of the lack of adequate data. On the other
hand, estimating the number of poor (understand-
ing this group as those who cannot afford a tar-
geted consumption bundle) allows us to broaden
our view, normally based only on average con-
sumption, about the part of aggregate demand
that is under more risk of food insecurity.
World poverty projections are sporadically
provided by the World Bank, through its World
development reports. In Appendix 4, we review
the methodology for forecasting poverty based on
the work of Anand and Kanbur (1991). They ana-
lyzed the World Bank methodology used to pro-
ject the number of absolute poor to 2000.
The World Bank presented baseline projec-
tions and alternative scenarios for the level of ab-
solute poverty in 2000 in its World development
reports of 1978, 1979, and 1990 (World Bank
1979, 1980, 1991). In all the cases the projec-
tions showed a decrease in the number of poor
from a figure of 770 million in 1975 to a range
between 260 million (projected in 1978 assum-
ing a high GNP growth rate) and 710 million
(projected in 1979 assuming a low GNP growth
rate) in the year 2000.
In Table 13 we compare the World Bank
projections of absolute poverty to the year 2000
with the most recent estimate of actual poverty
reported in the World development report 2000
(World Bank 2001). We also show how that num-
ber has evolved since 1975, using an income of
US$1 per day as the poverty line. We should,
however, urge caution in making too much of
year-to-year comparisons because country cover-
age has changed over time.
The differences between the projections and
the observed figures are substantial. The discre-
pancy is not only at the world level but also shows
up when regions are considered. It may be that the
1978 and 1979 projections were biased be-
cause the GNP per capita projections used could
not have anticipated the economic downturn in
the1980s. However, the same explanation is not
satisfactory for the 1990 projections, which un-
derestimated poverty by almost 375 million, a
projection error of −31 percent.
However, it is not clear from the text that ac-
companies the projections whether they should be
considered as normative simulations (that is, the
results from a reduction in the number of poor if
appropriate national and international policies
are applied), or they are meant to represent the
most likely scenario, and therefore could be con-
sidered as projections. The confusion can be seen
in the following paragraph from the 1990 World
development report:
The projections in this chapter are intended to show
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gained wider acceptance. They do not assume that all
countries will fully adopt the strategy. They do assume
that where it is in place, countries will at least move in
that direction. More specific details on domestic policy
are discussed below, region by region. The projections
are based on relatively favorable assumptions about
global economic conditions described in chapter 1—
growth in industrial countries of about 3 percent a year,
falling real interest rates, rising commodity prices over
the decade, and successful conclusion to the trade talks
at the Uruguay Round of the GATT and other forums.
This is the Report’s assessment of the most likely out-
come. But fear remains that the problems of the 1980s
will persist. The projections should be interpreted, there-
fore, as indicating what can reasonably be expected. It
would be possible to do somewhat better—or much
worse. (World Bank 1991, 138; emphasis added)
The conclusion must be that the models used to
project poverty seem weak. They are based on
unreliable data and are conditional upon meth-
odological assumptions about the functional forms
used, projections of population and income, the
transformation of income distributions from quin-
tiles to deciles, and the computations of the popu-
lation under the poverty line.
Some improvement in projections could come
from the methodological recommendations sug-
gested by Anand and Kanbur (1991). However,
the data needed are substantial. Also needed are
better income distribution data, based on surveys
in developing countries, which also provide infor-
mation about how consumption patterns change
with changes in the income distribution.39
5. Conclusions, Conjectures, and Closing
Comments
One final type of prediction deserves mention—
hindsight prediction—because it (and it alone) is 100
percent successful. It is the prediction of an event after it
has already occurred. All that is necessary to apply the
method are the ability to make ambiguous (or even
contradictory) remarks and a talent for selective am-
nesia. (Irwin D. J. Bross, 1959, 38)
Our conclusions, in and of themselves, are limited.
However, we also make some conjectures about a
broader set of propositions before closing with
some brief comments. We begin with conclusions
about the validity of formal, quantitative projec-
tion models. We then make some conjectures
about projection models compared with more
qualitative predictions. It is our conclusion that
many people making “forecasts” of future nega-
tive outcomes are really engaging in scenario
analysis, not prognostication. We conjecture why
they might do this. If most of the “doomsday” pre-
dictors are engaging in scenario analysis, then
they hope their predictions will not come true. This,
of course, begs the question of what they con-
tribute to the policy debate if we all know their
“predictions” are scenarios designed to move the
debate in a particular direction.
On the Accuracy (Validation) of
Projections
Conclusions from our analysis of formal, quantita-
tive projection models are limited if conclusions
are defined as only those that meet the require-
ments of formal statistical significance. We can
however reaffirm what others have found:
1. Projections with 5–10 year horizons are
more accurate than those for longer periods
(15–30 years). Given that most of the projec-
tion models reviewed develop their forecast
using historical data, trends are least likely to
change in the short run.
2. Projections are more accurate for aggre-
gations of components—regions/countries,
commodities—than for the component parts
themselves. Projections of global supply of
and demand for grains are more accurate
than projections for wheat in North America
or the United States.
3. There are significant differences between
projections for large versus small countries,
with those for small countries generally being
less accurate.
4. There are significant variations between
regional projections in terms of their accuracy.
The most erratic projections are for Sub-
Saharan Africa, a region made up of many
small countries and often characterized as
having inadequate data. This confirms that the
quality of data is important.
5. Given that most global food projection
models are recursive, nonspatial, price en-
dogenous trade models, differences in model
specification seem to explain fewer of the
differences in the performance of models than
do choices about data sources, base years,
the nature of commodity and country aggre-
gations, and methods of including domestic
policy. Thus, it is model construction decisions
rather than econometric specifications that
lead to differences.
6. Finally it seems clear that models using
past growth rates of a range of critical vari-
ables to predict the future do better than those40
that, in an ad hoc way, insert significant hy-
pothesized changes in one or a limited set of
critical parameters. There is an interesting ex-
ample in the population projection business.
Iowa State University sponsored a conference
in 1967 on “Alternatives for balancing world
food production needs.” They invited two
demographic analyses. The first, by Dudley
Kirk and Gavin Jones (see Iowa State Univer-
sity 1967) basically projected population to
2000 (33 years hence) using trend data of
birth rates, death rates, and migration. This
was the standard approach and their pro-
jected population for 2000 was 6.1 billion
people. The second paper, by Donald Bogue
(see Iowa State University 1967) argued per-
suasively that things were going to change
radically in the next 30 years and that the past
would be a bad predictor. He inserted his
conjectures about birth and death rates and
concluded that world population in 2000
would be just 4.5 billion. A check of actual
numbers shows that world population
reached 6 billion in late 1999 and that it had
exceeded 4.5 billion by 1982. This seems to
be the major difference between traditional
projection models and more qualitative pre-
diction models. The latter project major recent
changes in a few variables, whereas the for-
mer average these short-term perturbations
into longer range trends.
Some additional hypotheses were tested, for
which the conclusions are less clear. First, we hy-
pothesized that projections of global demand
would be more accurate because all the models
used basically the same exogenous source for
population projections, thus leaving only two
variables—per capita income and income
elasticity—to be generated (in some cases, only
the elasticity). On the supply side, in contrast,
three trend variables needed to be set within the
model: land use, yield, and intensity. The evidence
on this is mixed at best. During some periods,
models appear to do better on demand projec-
tions, whereas during other periods production
projections are better. None of the models ana-
lyzed was consistently better at projecting one
side of the equation compared with the other.
Secondly, we expected that practice would
lead in the direction of perfection, that is, those in
the business longer would improve over time.
Although there appears to be some support for
this proposition in the recurring FAO short-term
commodity projections, there is less support
elsewhere.
In concluding this brief section, we raise a
troubling (for us at least) issue. If one looks only at
global outcomes, most of the formal models do
very well in the 5- to 10-year projection range. But
when they are disaggregated into component
regions/countries or commodities, the accuracy
deteriorates, in some cases substantially. Yet the
most frequent use made of global models appears
to be to evaluate countries or regions, not the
global outcomes, as for example in IFPRI’s
detailed analysis of China. Should we declare a
model valid when the global projection is within
±5 percent, but when some of the components are
off by 30–50 percent in opposite directions? Our
conclusion is that this characteristic of most of the
models reviewed should raise serious questions
about the validity of the overall model.
Models versus Ad Hoc
Qualitative Predictions
Whereas in the previous section we were discuss-
ing how close projection models came to the ac-
tual outcomes, in this section we look at more ad
hoc qualitative predictions. The first obvious con-
clusion is that these “qualitative” predictions of
global negative outcomes (for example, massive
famines) find limited support in actual outcomes.
There have been no significant global or regional
famines since World War II induced by persistent
supply shortfalls. Thus the most stark predictions of
Ehrlich, the Paddock brothers, and the Club of
Rome fortunately never occurred. The persistent
predictions by Lester Brown and his colleagues at
the Worldwatch Institute of imminent food short-
ages and rising long-term real food prices have
not yet come true. Price spikes in the 1970s and
1990s were quickly deflated by expanded pro-41
duction, and long-term real grain prices resumed
their 100-year downward trend. Although some
authors might argue that their predictions are
mainly for years yet to come, there is no evidence
of emerging trends pointing in the direction of
significant rises in real food prices.
Why then do models seem to do better? Here
we provide some possible answers:
1. Building a model, which can be solved, re-
quires consistent and clearly defined relations
among all variables. Ad hoc models have no simi-
lar constraint.
2. Estimating models based on trends has two
advantages. First, it transfers to the future the struc-
ture of interrelationships among variables, which
was consistent in the past. Second, it builds in
many complex and not fully specified cross-
relationships among variables. Ad hoc predic-
tions have no built-in ways to check consistency,
prevent double counting, prevent arbitrary
weighting of a particular variable, or force a con-
vergence to a stable equilibrium.
3. Modeling allows the simultaneous and man-
aged interaction of many variables and the main-
tenance of consistent weights.
4. Clearly, systems of equations, managed in a
computer program, allow the organized and con-
sistent treatment of massive numbers of variables
and large amounts of data. Ad hoc, partial, quali-
tative approaches, even when used by the most
brilliant minds, cannot do this consistently.
5. Most models are explicitly based on tested the-
oretical or conceptual underpinning. Ad hoc
models, even if computer simulated, can perform
poorly (see Nordhaus’s critique of the Club of
Rome models, 1973). Although qualitative predic-
tions, such as those of Lester Brown, Paul Ehrlich,
and others, must be based on the conceptual
framework they use to analyze complex sce-
narios, these “implicit models” are seldom for-
malized and therefore cannot be replicated.
6. Most of the currently used projection models
are equilibrium models, which, by construction,
implies continuous adjustment to produce consis-
tent stable conclusions. Ad hoc approaches in-
volve extrapolation of particular variables of inter-
est and do not have equilibrating factors such as
prices and elasticities built in.
7. Finally, let it be noted that formal modelers
eschew the very long run because they understand
how small initial errors can exponentially blow up
a model as the timeframe lengthens. Longer-term
predictors on the other hand seem to be driven by




There is perhaps a more basic question that needs
to be raised. Are we really evaluating projections
of an expected (positive) outcome in the future (as
we clearly are in population projections)? Or are
people making conditional forecasts of possible
future outcomes, based on alternative assump-
tions about crucial exogenous and endogenous
variables (for example, income growth or yield
growth)?
It is likely that many people engage in futurol-
ogy to explore the consequences of business as
usual compared with alternative assumptions
about income growth or water availability, for ex-
ample. Clearly, most of the USDA “projections”
are explicitly scenarios based on alternative as-
sumptions about income or trade. People also en-
gage in scenario analyses to explore what would
be required to bring about a desired (normative)
future result. The first three World food surveys by
FAO are clearly of this type. In addition, models
and ad hoc predictions provide vehicles for ex-
ploring the sensitivity of potential outcomes to par-
ticular parameters. The IFPRI IMPACT model (Rose-
grant, Agcaoili-Sombilla, and Perez 1995) has
productivity growth as a function of research ex-
penditure. Thus IFPRI can “explore” (not project)
the consequences of significant reductions in re-
search investments. Finally, models allow us to test
the capacity of systems to withstand shocks, and
recursive models allow us to observe the path of
adjustments to those shocks.
If most predictions, and many projections, are
indeed conditional forecasts of possible future out-42
comes (scenarios), then they are by definition nor-
mative models (implicitly or explicitly). They are
not positive modeling attempts. The implication is
that attempting to validate these models by com-
paring projected outcomes with actual outcomes
is inappropriate. A more appropriate test may be
whether or not the analysis enriched the policy
debate. In fact, “failure to come true” could be
considered by the authors to be a sign of success
because an undesirable outcome was avoided.
Thus we conclude that “failure to come true” is
not always a negative conclusion. Quantitative
projections are useful in forecasting actual out-
comes given a continuation of past trends and
should be judged as we have done in this paper,
that is, by how close they came to actual numbers.
Others who explicitly model scenarios and those
who predict negative outcomes if action is not
taken (scenarios) also can contribute to an im-
proved future. They may well alert policymakers
and citizens to major issues that need attention.
This conclusion is similar to that of David Wilson in
his interesting and provocative book The history of
the future.
The whole idea of forecasting the future is fraught with
so many problems and perils that it is not worth pursu-
ing. Still, the idea of speculating about where we might
be going, how we feel and think about such directions,
and what we might do to change or continue our course
is not only healthy but essential to our survival and
development as a species. It is in this spirit, together
with a sense of humility, an awareness of complexity, a
deep distrust for utopian solutions, and a skeptical atti-
tude towards apocalyptic scenarios, that we should, on
my view, approach the unknown world of the future.
(Wilson 2000, 258)43


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2. Overview of Models Used to
Project Food Situation
The models selected for evaluation fall into two
categories: (1) trend projection models and (2)
world trade models.
Trend projection models forecast the gap be-
tween consumption and production for a country
or region, assuming that relative prices over time
are constant. Both components, production and
consumption, are projected separately according
to their historical trend. In the case of production,
which is expressed as the product of land area
and yields, projections are made by applying
their historical growth rates to each component. In
the case of consumption, this is expressed as the
product of per capita consumption and popula-
tion. Whereas population projections are taken
from elsewhere (usually, United Nations projec-
tions), per capita consumption is projected based
on its association with (that is, as a function of) per
capita income. Projections of per capita income
also can be taken from elsewhere (for instance,
from the International Monetary Fund or from the
World Bank), or can be projected by applying its
own historical growth rate to baseline data. Then,
assuming an income elasticity (that is, a coefficient
that measures how much of the increase in income
is spent on food), it is possible to project per capita
consumption and then, by multiplying per capita
consumption and population, to obtain total con-
sumption. We found two types of trend projection
models in the literature. In pure trend projection
models (which encompass most of the models we
found in this category), the difference between
projected consumption and projected production
generates a gap, which if positive indicates a
shortage of the commodity or if negative a surplus
of the commodity. The extended trend projection
models start by generating the projected gap, as
in the pure trend models, and then use this informa-
tion to build a spatial trade model to distribute the
surpluses or deficits among regions/countries.
The second category includes world trade
models, which allow for the interaction among
countries and regions through trade. Each region
in this model is characterized by a demand and a
supply function, which relate quantities to prices.
Demand is shifted by changes in income and in
population and supply is shifted by changes in
yields and land area. The difference between sup-
ply and demand in each region generates an ex-
cess of supply or demand for the commodity,
which, when aggregated into a world market,
allows the determination of a market clearing
world price (that is, at the equilibrium world price
the total amount of required imports will be equal
to the total amount of available exports). Because
of this feature, these models are called flexible
prices or price endogenous models. Therefore
these models not only predict trade volumes but
also predict commodity prices. All the current
models used to project the world food situation fall
into this category.
We will briefly review two types of world trade
models:  nonspatial and spatial world trade
models. The nonspatial models predict only the net
trade position of the country (say, net importer or
exporter) without specifying import sources or ex-
port destinations; the spatial models make two
predictions, that is, the region’s net trade and
trade flows by sources and destinations. It is impor-
tant to note that these are not the only types of
agricultural trade models but are the types com-
monly used for projecting the food situation. A50
specific survey of agricultural trade models can be
found in Thompson (1981). In addition, in Appen-
dix 1 we present a summary table with a brief
description of models and projections.
Trend Projection Models
In this category we consider models that make
projections of consumption and production based
on the historical growth rates. Both consumption
and production are independently projected with-
out allowing for interaction between them. The
final output of this type of model is the food gap
(positive if there is a deficit of the commodity or
negative if there is a surplus). We differentiate
between two types of models: pure trend projec-
tion models, which follow the previous descrip-
tion, and the extended trend projection models,
which include a second stage in which they ana-
lyze how to distribute commodity surpluses and
deficits among regions through trade.
Pure Trend Projection Models
This subcategory encompasses most of the trend
projection models produced from the early 1960s
to the mid-1980s, such as FAO’s projections from
the 1960s to early 1980s, IFPRI’s 1977 and
1986 projections, the OECD’s 1960s projec-
tions, and USDA’s 1960s projections.
Equation (1) represents the final output of this
type of model, that is the “food gap” or “gap,”
defined as the difference between consumption
and production. The gap can be for a specific
commodity (for example, wheat) or for a group of
commodities (for example, cereals or food).




pc, ηi,j,t) × POPi,t − ACi,j,t(t) × YCi,j,t (1)
The sub-indices i, j, t denote the country, the
commodity, and the year, while the supra-index
“pc” stands for per capita. The commodity con-
sumption is expressed as the product of the per
capita consumption (that is, Qi,j,t) and the popula-
pc
tion (that is, POPi,t). In these models, per capita
consumption varies (in the form of a function) ac-
cording to two components: the per capita in-
come, INC
pc
i,j,t and the income elasticity (that is,
a coefficient that indicates the portion of an in-
crease of 1 percent in the per capita income is
destined to consumption).
Per capita income in these models is projected
either by applying the observed historical growth
rate to a starting per capita income or by taking
projections made by another agency, such as the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. It
is important to point out that, if the income per
capita is projected using trend techniques, the re-
sults are highly sensitive to the choice of the initial
point (that is, starting period) and to the assumed
growth rate for the variable, because lower or
higher than normal initial values or too low or too
high growth rates would produce deviations from
the base income per capita that tend to increase
substantially over time.
The income elasticity, ηi,j,t, can change by
country (for example, we expect income elasticity
to be lower for developed countries than for
developing countries, because developing coun-
tries spend a higher proportion of the increase of
their per capita income on food than do devel-
oped countries), can change by commodity (for
example, not all the commodities have the same
importance for all the countries; it depends on their
specific consumption bundles—for instance, the
elasticity for rice should be lower in some countries
than the elasticity for wheat), and also can change
with time (for example, countries’ consumption
evolves over time and the importance of some
commodities increases or decreases).
Population is assumed exogenous. It is custom-
ary to take the most likely projection scenario from
the agencies that prepare population projections,
such as the United Nations (the U.N. medium-
variant population projection is the most common
choice), the U.S. Department of Commerce (Cen-
sus Bureau), or the World Bank.
Production in trend models is represented by
the product of two components (ACi,j,t), which
stands for the harvested area (in the case of crop
production), or by the number of slaughtered ani-
mals (in the case of meat production), or by the
number of animals producing milk, times the ap-
propriate yield (YCi,j,t). This yield can be a crop
yield per unit of land, meat yield per animal51
slaughtered, or quantity of milk per animal. The
projection of total production is then made by
projecting each component based on its historical
trend and just multiplying the projected land (or
animals in the case of livestock) and yields.
It is important to note that, in these types of
models, there is no interaction between the con-
sumption and production of the commodity. For
instance, according to economic theory, one
would expect that, if consumption exceeds pro-
duction, price would tend to rise, increasing
production and constraining demand. In these
models, since prices are assumed constant, grow-
ing exogenous variables (that is, population and
per capita income) could result in a gap that tends
to grow unbounded over time.
Owing to the sensitivity of the model to the
starting point and to the assumed growth rates for
consumption and production, agencies normally
present additional projection scenarios, typically
based on different growth rates of per capita in-
come, such as low and high per capita income
growth. In addition, they might present other sce-
narios of a normative character, such as the re-
quired growth to reach a targeted food security
goal (for example, IFPRI’s models).
The same methodology used to project pro-
duction and consumption can be applied to the
projection of trade (that is, the projection of im-
ports and exports). For instance, IFPRI (Paulino
1986) projected trade based on its historical
trend, and included the result as part of the gap
calculation (for example, imports are part of the
total supply of the commodity in the country and
exports reduce the amount of commodity avail-
able in the country for consumption). It is important
to note that the application of the methodology to
exports and imports may produce acceptable re-
sults only in cases where the country is a typical net
importer or exporter of the commodity. However,
if the country is on the margin of self-sufficiency
and is switching between trade positions over time
(that is, from importer to exporter and vice versa),
then this methodology will perform less well.
Extended Trend Projection Models
Under this category we include the model by
Blakeslee, Heady, and Framingham (1973),
which was used to project production, demand,
and trade for 1975, 1985, and 2000. This model
is a hybrid between the described trend projection
models and the spatial world commodity models,
which are models that explain the geographical
(that is, spatial) pattern observed in trade.
Projections in this model are built using a two-
stage procedure. In the first stage, commodity con-
sumption and production are projected, as in the
trend projection models, producing the food gap
(recall that the gap can be positive if the country
requires more commodity or negative if the coun-
try possesses the commodity in excess). Blakeslee,
Heady, and Framingham projected the produc-
tion and consumption of cereals, raw sugar, root
crops, pulses, fruits and vegetables, oil crops,
meat, milk, and eggs. The second stage used a
spatial trade model formulated only for cereals,
and taking as input the cereal requirements and
surpluses estimated for each country in the first
stage.
The spatial trade model is an optimization
model intended to compute the best possible set of
trade flows (that is, imports and exports) among
countries or regions, in such a way that the total
cost of transporting the commodity from a region
with commodity surplus to a region with com-
modity deficit is the minimum possible. Transporta-
tion costs are shipping costs (which normally de-
pend on the distance between two locations),
insurance, and freight. The Blakeslee et al. model
looks in addition for the set of trade flows that
generates the minimum total cost of production of
the commodity destined for export and domestic
consumption. It also considers the cost of expand-
ing the production capacity. The previous problem
(that is, the optimal trade flow) is solved consider-




The essential characteristic of these models is that
commodity prices and trade volumes are deter-
mined within the model and all the regions in the
model are interconnected. In some cases, the
models also present interconnections among com-52
modities through the cross price elasticities, allow-
ing for substitution, for instance, between different
grains.
The impetus for building multi-region price en-
dogenous models to forecast the world food situa-
tion came from the instability of commodity prices
experienced during the early 1970s. The sudden
rise in commodity prices, on one side, made the
assumption of constant relative prices inadequate
for projection purposes, and, on the other side,
made commodity prices an interesting variable to
be forecast within the models. In the world trade
models, domestic prices are linked in a perfect or
imperfect way to international prices, depending
on whether or not the existence of border policy
measures (such as tariffs or quotas) or domestic
policies (such as price supports) influences the
transmission of international prices.
The world trade models used for projection of
production and consumption fall into two cate-
gories: nonspatial and spatial trade models. For
other types of agricultural trade models see
Thompson (1981). Nonspatial trade models pre-
dict the net trade position of the region but not the
flow of trade (the source of imports or the destina-
tion of exports). Spatial trade models predict the
source and destination of trade flows as well.
We will briefly review only the nonspatial and
spatial trade models, because of their importance
in forecasting the world food situation. For refer-
ences about market share models, see Thompson
(1981).
World Nonspatial Trade Models
This category includes all the current models used
for projecting commodity balances, prices, and
trade. Examples are USDA’s GOL model (Rojko et
al. 1978), the different versions of FAO’s World
Food Model (see Yanagishima 2000 for a recent
description of the model), IFPRI’s IMPACT model
(see Rosegrant, Agcaoili-Sombilla, and Perez
1995), FAPRI’s commodity models (see Meyers,
Devadoss, and Helmar 1986), the IIASA World
Agricultural Model (Parikh and Rabar 1981), the
Free University of Amsterdam’s Model of Inter-
national Relations in Agriculture (MOIRA) (Linne-
mann et al. 1979), and the World Bank model
(Mitchell, Ingco, and Duncan 1997).
It is important to note that there are many
differences among the models in this group. A first
difference is whether the model is recursive or
static. A model is static if, given a baseline of
production and consumption and projected rates
of change in critical parameters, an estimate is
made for a particular point in the future (that is, a
target year). It is important to note that this model
gives us a point estimate for the goal year but does
not tell us anything about the path to reach that
point. An alternative approach would consist of
moving toward that final year by estimating the
model a year at a time and moving recursively
toward the final year. Sometimes these models are
also called dynamic because they allow the simu-
lation of the dynamic trajectory of the variables
over time. All the current models used for projec-
tions (that is, FAO’s World Food Model, FAPRI’s
World Agriculture Outlook Model, IFPRI’s IMPACT
Model, and USDA’s Baseline Projections Model)
are recursive, which may be interpreted as an
interest in observing the dynamics of the model’s
core variables. In addition, the presence of lags in
the models is useful for introducing the presence of
adjustment costs in the relationships.
A second difference is whether the equations
of the model are linear or are constant elasticity
equations (these being the two functional forms
used most frequently in the literature). An equation
is said to be constant elastic if for instance, in the
case of the consumption equation, it indicates that
consumption always captures the same propor-
tion of an increase in per capita income regard-
less of the level of income. Constant elasticity func-
tions are used in current models, whereas linear
functions were used in the earlier models. The
reason behind this change is that linear models
represent changes in the variables well when their
values are clustered around their equilibrium
value. However, if a shock (such as a negative
weather shock that reduces the harvest) is such that
it makes prices deviate significantly from their his-
toric equilibrium values, the resulting prediction is
distorted because elasticities change from small to
large or vice versa along a linear demand or sup-
ply function. A constant elasticity function over-
comes this problem. Another way to understand
the effect of linear demand projection models is by53
noting that, if the income elasticity of demand is
less than one (as it is for food), the share of total
expenditures devoted to the commodity declines
as real per capita incomes increase. But it is also
true that, as per capita income increases, the in-
come elasticity of demand for food declines. How
these aspects of the demand for food are treated in
models obviously affects projections of the future
adequacy of food supplies relative to demand.
The decline both in the rate of population growth
and in the income elasticity of demand has pro-
duced the low and declining rates of growth in the
demand for food in the future. This in turn reduces
the required food supply growth.
A third methodological difference is in the
number of equations modeled, for instance, if
commodity stocks are modeled explicitly, such as
in the World Bank model, or if they are modeled as
part of the demand (that is, stocks plus current
utilization).
Despite the noted differences, in general it is
possible to represent these models by the follow-
ing expression, which also allows us to compare
them with the trend projection models.
∑Gapi,j,t = Consumption − Production
i
= ∑Q




− ACi,j,t(t, Pi,j,t, σi,j,t) × YCi,j,t(t, Pi,j,t, ϕi,j,t) ≡ 0 (2)
There are two main differences in equation (2)
compared with equation (1). The first difference is
the presence of Pj,t, the domestic commodity
prices, and εi,j,t, σi,j,t, ϕi,j,t, which are the price
elasticities of per capita demand, yields, and acre-
age, respectively. In addition, it should be noted
that the functions embedded in equation (2)—that
is, per capita demand, acreage, and yield—
might also include the price of other substitute or
complementary commodities. The second differ-
ence is that the sum of all the gaps or surpluses
faced by each country has to add up to zero (that
is, to clear the market). It is important to note that
this is the most significant difference from the trend
projection models because it allows for the deter-
mination of the changes in price implied by
projected changes in supply and demand.
These models can accommodate changes in
tariffs over time fairly well, but they have problems
incorporating country-specific trade barriers (for
instance, the minimum access of commodity im-
ports from China to the United States) since they
do not predict trade flows. This feature may be
important for projections made during a trade lib-
eralization period such as the current period.
World Spatial Trade Models
There are two main motivations for these types of
model. First, they predict trade flows. Second,
based on the first motivation, they allow nontariff
trade barriers such as quotas to be accommo-
dated directly (even if this advantage may be par-
tially reduced after the “tariffication” of interna-
tional quotas and other nontariff trade barriers).
Examples of these types of model in the literature
are the second model presented in Rojko et al.
(1971) and Dixit and Sharples’ (1987) model for
the wheat market.
The typical structure of spatial trade models
consists of the minimization of the total transporta-
tion costs of trade among regions, subject to con-
straints that represent the characteristics of the
different regions. For a detailed description of
these models see Takayama and Judge (1971)
and Thompson (1981).
It is important to note that spatial models do
not predict trade flows well. In reality the predicted
trade flows differ substantially from the observed
flows. The reasons advanced to explain this phe-
nomenon are the presence of quantitative trade
barriers, the heterogeneity of commodities in
terms of characteristics and seasonality, which
makes commodities from different sources imper-
fect substitutes, and risk diversification strategies
being pursued by importers.
Given that the prediction of trade flows has
little value in long-term projections, these models
are seldom used for that purpose. Thus we do not
review them further.54
Appendix 3. Overview of Methods Used to
Validate Models
According to Theil (1961), the exercise of validat-
ing a model by comparing the projected figures
with actual data can be performed in three differ-
ent ways.
The first is to compare the projection directly
with the actual figure. This is the most straight-
forward way, and does not require major
explanation.
The second is to replace the projected value of
exogenous variables in the model with the actual
value at the projection end point, and run the
projection of the endogenous variable (for ex-
ample, consumption) again. Then we can com-
pare this new projection with the observed actual
value of the endogenous variables. This would
eliminate the error introduced from projecting the
exogenous variable (for example, from projecting
the income).
The third method can be illustrated with an
example. Let us consider world trade models. In
these models, consumption depends on income
and on prices. Whereas income is an exogenous
variable to the model, prices are determined in-
side the model (that is, they are an endogenous
variable). What Theil proposes in this third
method is to replace not only income, as in the
second method, but also the prices that enter into
the consumption equation on the right-hand side of
the equation with actual values. Again, this pro-
cedure will produce a third estimate of consump-
tion, which can be compared with the actual
value. Theil recognized that the requirements in
applying the three procedures increase from the
first, which requires only projections and the ac-
tual values of the endogenous variables, to the
third, which requires the values of the endogenous
and exogenous variables plus the structure of the
model. In our case, constraints in terms of informa-
tion about models made the first method the only
feasible evaluation method.55
Appendix 4. Review of the Methodology to
Forecast Poverty
The World Bank methodology presented in Ahlu-
walia, Carter, and Chenery (1979) consisted of
four steps:
1. Estimation of the income level of each
country for the past (1960–75) and the pro-
jection of this level for the future (1975–
2000).
2. Estimation and projection of population by
country for the same periods.
3. Estimation and projection of income
shares by deciles for each country, obtaining,
with this, the level of income for each decile
group.
4. Determination of the number of people be-
low the absolute poverty line.
The crucial step in the methodology is the
projection of the income distribution to year
2000. This step is addressed using the methodol-
ogy developed by Ahluwalia (1976), which con-
sisted of regressing the income share of a given
quintile for a country on the logarithm of the coun-
try’s per capita GNP, the squared logarithm of the
country’s per capita GNP, and a dummy for social-
ist country. It is important to note that, in a first
stage, the methodology computes the income
distribution in quintiles, which are interpolated to
create income deciles. The equation estimated by
Ahluwalia (1976) for a cross-sectional data set of
60 countries is
Qi = α + β(log Yi) + γ(log Yi)2 + δDi + εi
i = 1, 2, . . . , 60,
where Qi is the income share of a given quintile for
country i, Yi is the country’s per capita GNP, Di is a
dummy variable for socialist countries, and εi is a
random error term.
Clearly, whether the methodology is accurate
or not, it relies importantly on the quality of the
data: population, GNP, and income distribution.
Of the three variables used, the last two are partic-
ularly subject to major errors, especially for de-
veloping countries. In addition, the presence of a
country in the sample depended on whether the
country has data on income distribution, a factor
that excluded an important number of countries
from the sample and, of course, reduced the repre-
sentativeness of the sample used to infer the
world’s number of absolute poor.
Regarding the methodology, which is based
on the relationship between income distribution
and growth (that is, Kuznetz’ “U hypothesis”),
Anand and Kanbur (1991) found two problems:
first, it was dependent on the functional form used
to estimate the income share; and, second, the
regression estimated should have been a limited-
dependent variable regression, even if this last
point would be troublesome only for countries with
extreme income distributions. In addition, they
constructed confidence bounds for the poverty es-
timates and found them too wide to be useful,
since they could imply either an increase or a
decrease in the number of poor.
In conclusion, Anand and Kanbur found “that
their projections [Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chen-
ery] of poverty are not robust to reasonable
changes and improvements in the methodology:
in some cases even the time trend of the projec-
tions is reversed. Analysts and policy makers
should, therefore, treat such global poverty fore-
casts with caution” (1991, 1).56





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1962 1966 1970 1980 1985











Aggregated −16.5 −20.9 −25.5 −84.0 −89.6 −14.4 −15.4 −22.0
Production 138.5 157.7 181.3 297.5 321.1 131.4 −5.1 142.7 −9.5 156.7 −13.6
Consumption 122.0 136.8 155.8 213.4 231.5 117.0 −4.1 127.3 −7.0 134.7 −13.5
Production
North America 45.8 56.0 53.9 86.7 90.1 43.2 −5.5 43.7 −22.0 57.7 7.0
Canada 14.3 18.8 13.9 20.4 25.6 13.3 −6.8 13.8 −26.8 16.0 15.1
United States 31.5 37.2 40.0 66.2 64.5 29.9 −5.0 29.9 −19.6 41.7 4.2
Western Europe 39.9 46.0 48.9 63.5 83.9 38.5 −3.7 41.2 −10.5 36.3 −25.9
Africa and Middle Easte 18.1 20.3 23.1 31.6 35.1 18.5 1.9 20.3 −0.1 22.3 −3.4
North Africa and Middle East 16.5 18.6 20.4 28.6 31.8 17.5 5.8 19.3 3.9 21.2 3.7
Central Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 −g 0.2 −g 0.0 −g
East Africa 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.1 −86.0 0.1 −88.5 0.2 −85.1
South Africa 0.8 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.1 0.7 −12.1 0.8 −1.4 0.9 −35.8
India 11.3 11.3 20.9 49.6 45.5 10.4 −7.8 13.0 14.6 13.9 −33.3
Latin America and Caribbean 10.3 10.7 11.6 15.0 20.9 10.5 1.1 11.5 7.2 12.6 8.5
Upper Latin America and
Caribbean
1.6 2.0 2.1 2.7 4.4 1.4 −10.0 1.7 −11.5 2.3 13.4
Lower Latin America 8.8 8.8 9.5 12.3 16.5 9.1 3.1 9.8 11.4 10.2 7.4
Consumption
North America 20.2 22.6 26.4 27.2 36.7 20.5 1.8 22.0 −2.6 26.1 −1.2
Canada 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.8 4.6 15.9 4.9 12.8 6.0 28.5
United States 16.2 18.3 21.7 21.9 30.9 15.9 −1.6 17.1 −6.2 20.1 −7.6
Western Europe 48.7 50.8 55.5 56.3 66.5 46.8 −3.9 48.1 −5.3 44.8 −19.2
Africa and Middle Easte 23.0 26.9 30.9 49.4 59.2 22.9 −0.6 25.5 −5.2 29.7 −3.8
North Africa and Middle East 21.0 24.4 27.9 45.4 53.6 20.6 −1.6 22.9 −6.0 26.9 −3.7
Central Africa 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 −g 1.1 −g 0.8 −g
East Africa 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 3.1 0.3 −69.5 0.3 −71.0 0.7 −55.0
South Africa 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.9 2.2 1.0 4.7 1.1 −9.5 1.4 3.8
Indiaf 14.9 18.4 22.4 53.1 44.1 14.5 −3.2 17.6 −4.4 18.9 −15.7
Latin America and Caribbean 12.0 14.1 16.2 22.1 25.0 12.4 3.7 14.2 0.7 15.2 −6.1
Upper Latin America and
Caribbean
2.5 3.2 3.8 6.0 7.5 2.5 −3.7 2.8 −12.0 3.2 −16.0
Lower Latin America 9.4 10.8 12.4 16.1 17.5 9.9 5.8 11.3 4.5 12.0 −3.159




















−59.5 −77.1 −77.9 −76.0 −46.0 −60.7 −63.9 −56.9 −70.4
247.6 −16.7 277.6 −6.7 297.6 0.1 288.5 −3.0 223.4 −24.9 270.3 −15.8 285.6 −11.1 259.8 −19.1 292.0 −9.1
188.1 −11.9 200.5 −6.1 219.7 2.9 212.5 −0.4 177.4 −16.9 209.6 −9.4 221.6 −4.2 202.9 −12.4 221.6 −4.3
61.8 −28.7 60.4 −30.3 83.5 −3.6 75.7 −12.6 62.8 −27.5 81.9 −9.1 99.9 10.9 66.7 −26.0 89.1 −1.1
18.6 −8.9 17.6 −13.8 27.4 34.1 24.3 19.0 19.3 −5.5 21.7 −15.2 24.8 −3.1 19.7 −23.2 22.6 −11.6
43.2 −34.8 42.8 −35.4 56.1 −15.3 51.4 −22.4 43.5 −34.3 60.2 −6.7 75.1 16.5 47.1 −27.0 66.5 3.0
51.7 −18.6 51.5 −18.9 50.6 −20.3 48.2 −24.1 51.7 −18.6 54.6 −34.9 49.3 −41.3 60.6 −27.8 47.5 −43.4
25.3 −19.9 27.9 −11.6 27.3 −13.5 27.8 −12.0 23.7 −24.9 36.4 3.8 37.4 6.7 36.0 2.5 42.6 21.4
23.2 −18.8 25.7 −10.1 25.4 −11.1 25.6 −10.4 21.5 −24.8 32.8 3.2 33.6 5.7 32.5 2.0 38.9 22.1
0.0 −g 0.0 −g 0.0 −g 0.0 −g 0.0 −g 0.8 −g 0.8 −g 0.8 −g 0.8 −g
0.8 −24.9 0.9 −15.5 0.9 −15.5 0.9 −15.5 0.9 −15.5 0.6 −52.4 0.6 −50.5 0.5 −53.4 0.7 −44.4
1.3 −33.8 1.3 −33.8 1.0 −49.1 1.3 −33.8 1.3 −33.8 2.3 9.4 2.4 17.9 2.2 5.0 2.3 11.6
46.3 −6.6 59.9 20.9 59.9 20.9 59.9 20.9 35.4 −28.6 39.9 −12.4 40.1 −12.0 39.9 −12.4 46.7 2.6
16.2 8.2 18.0 20.3 16.4 9.6 17.0 13.6 14.4 −3.8 17.5 −16.0 18.8 −9.9 16.7 −19.9 19.3 −7.5
3.2 18.5 4.0 48.1 3.9 44.4 3.9 44.4 2.7 −0.0 2.8 −37.1 3.0 −32.6 2.7 −39.3 3.3 −24.2
13.0 6.0 14.0 14.1 12.5 1.9 13.1 6.8 11.7 −4.6 14.8 −10.3 15.8 −3.8 14.0 −14.8 16.0 −3.0
26.8 −1.4 29.6 8.9 39.7 46.1 34.3 26.2 24.8 −8.8 30.6 −16.5 30.2 −17.6 30.0 −18.0 31.5 −14.2
4.3 −18.8 4.7 −11.2 9.4 77.6 7.4 39.8 4.0 −24.4 5.9 2.9 6.0 4.3 5.8 0.2 6.1 6.3
22.5 2.8 24.9 13.8 30.3 38.4 26.9 22.9 20.8 −5.0 24.7 −20.1 24.2 −21.7 24.3 −21.4 25.3 −18.0
51.7 −8.1 53.0 −5.8 57.3 1.8 57.1 1.5 50.7 −9.9 58.8 −11.6 60.2 −9.5 56.7 −14.8 61.4 −7.7
42.0 −15.0 44.8 −9.3 45.3 −8.3 44.6 −9.7 39.8 −19.4 54.3 −8.3 57.1 −3.5 52.6 −11.1 55.4 −6.4
37.2 −18.1 39.7 −12.5 40.0 −11.9 39.9 −12.1 35.7 −21.4 48.4 −9.7 49.9 −6.9 46.9 −12.5 49.3 −7.9
1.5 −g 1.7 −g 1.7 −g 1.7 −g 1.4 −g 2.5 −g 2.7 −g 2.4 −g 2.7 −g
1.5 −17.6 1.6 −12.1 1.7 −6.6 1.7 −6.6 1.4 −23.1 1.3 −58.8 2.5 −19.2 1.2 −59.6 1.3 −57.7
1.8 −6.8 1.8 −6.8 1.9 −1.7 1.3 −32.7 1.3 −32.7 2.1 −4.7 2.1 −4.2 2.1 −5.8 2.1 −4.0
46.0 −13.4 52.8 −0.5 54.0 1.7 53.4 0.6 43.5 −18.1 41.3 −6.4 48.7 10.4 39.4 −10.8 48.0 8.9
21.6 −2.5 20.3 −8.4 23.4 5.6 23.1 4.3 18.6 −16.0 24.7 −1.4 25.4 1.7 24.1 −3.4 25.3 1.1
5.5 −8.8 4.0 −33.7 6.4 6.1 6.3 4.5 2.7 −55.2 5.4 −27.6 5.8 −22.8 5.2 −30.9 5.8 −22.8
16.1 −0.1 16.3 1.1 17.0 5.5 16.8 4.2 15.9 −1.4 19.2 9.9 19.6 12.2 18.9 8.4 19.5 11.4
Sources: Actual data are from the USDA PS&D database. Projections are from World GOL model (Rojko, Urban, and Na¨ive 1971; Rojko et al. 1978).
Notes: An error with a negative sign indicates an underestimate.
a The figures correspond to three-year averages centered in the reported year.
b I = Continuation of policies and moderate gain in productivity in developing countries. II = Higher productivity and economic growth than in I in developing
countries. II-A = Major exporters maintain their share in the world grain market. II-B = Major developed importers adjust their domestic prices with international
prices. III = Lower agricultural production and economic growth in developing countries than in scenario I.
c I = Continuation of the trend in terms of economic growth and policies. II = High economic growth that leads to higher level of imports. III = Low income growth
that reduces import demand. IV = Moderately higher productivity in developing countries in the context of high income growth and strong world import
demand.
d Considers only the countries presented in the table.
e Includes only those countries considered in the projection.
f Figures for 1980 (actual and projection) are for South East Asia and not only for India.
g Greater than 100 percent.60












Aggregateb −62.3 −66.9 −73.7 −78.3 −85.4 −90.5
Supply 362.5 325.3 349.2 371.3 2.4 398.5 22.5 427.0 22.3
Demand 300.2 258.4 275.5 293.0 −2.4 313.1 21.2 336.5 22.1
United States −31.6 −28.8 −27.2 −53.3 −55.8 −56.2
Supply 80.3 74.7 87.3 112.8 40.5 123.4 65.3 134.2 53.7
Demand 48.7 45.8 60.1 59.5 22.3 67.6 47.5 78.0 29.8
Canada −21.0 −18.7 −18.9 −25.8 −30.6 −35.4
Supply 36.9 33.8 34.2 41.8 13.3 47.7 41.1 54.3 58.5
Demand 15.9 15.1 15.3 15.9 0.1 17.2 13.6 18.9 23.2
Australia and New Zealand −9.7 −12.7 −16.4 −16.3 −19.1 −22.2
Supply 16.4 19.2 26.1 23.9 46.0 27.0 40.8 30.5 17.0
Demand 6.7 6.5 9.7 7.6 14.0 8.0 22.7 8.4 −13.6
Argentina −5.8 −7.3 −11.8 −6.8 −8.2 −9.9
Supply 10.8 12.2 16.2 11.6 8.1 13.3 9.3 15.2 −6.0
Demand 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.8 −2.6 5.1 3.9 5.3 19.4
EC-10 −20.4 −15.7 −15.4 −13.7 −14.7 −15.4
Supply 94.0 93.5 105.2 68.9 −26.7 71.9 −23.0 74.5 −29.2
Demand 73.7 77.7 89.8 55.3 −24.9 57.2 −26.4 59.1 −34.2
Japan 5.2 5.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.7
Supply 2.5 1.6 1.7 2.8 14.9 3.3 100.4 3.7 120.4
Demand 7.7 7.4 7.0 8.6 12.7 9.0 22.8 9.4 34.5
USSR 17.0 3.3 1.0 24.0 28.9 34.4
Supply 113.4 83.3 71.5 101.4 −10.6 102.3 22.9 103.1 44.1
Demand 130.4 86.5 72.5 125.4 −3.8 131.2 51.6 137.4 89.6
Brazil 3.5 6.0 7.7 6.1 6.5 6.6
Supply 4.1 3.0 3.0 4.1 0.4 5.0 64.1 6.1 101.7
Demand 7.6 9.0 10.7 10.2 34.5 11.5 27.2 12.7 18.4
Mexico 0.4 1.4 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.9
Supply 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.9 −9.9 4.6 12.6 5.3 38.1
Demand 4.7 5.4 5.9 5.5 18.2 6.3 16.7 7.2 22.0
Sources: Actual data are from the USDA PS&D database. Projections are baseline projections from Liu and Seeley 1987).
Notes: Supply is defined as production plus beginning of year stocks and demand as consumption plus end of year stocks. An error
with a negative sign indicates an underestimate.
a Actual data are centered averages on the reported year, except 2000, which is the average of only the 1999 and 2000 figures.
b Considers only the regions projected.61
Table 18—Comparison among IFPRI food production projections to 1990 and 2000









Developing countries 591.0 1,433.7 591.6 0.1 1,471.0 2.6
Asia 318.9 1,028.7 298.2 −6.5 1,035.0 0.6
Chinab 2.2 509.7 3.1 41.4 501.0 −1.7
South Asia 225.0 321.9 203.9 −9.4 323.0 0.3
East and South East Asia 91.7 197.1 91.2 −0.5 211.0 7.0
North Africa/Middle East 83.2 104.5 70.5 −15.2 119.0 13.8
Northern Africa 28.4 35.8 27.9 −1.5 35.0 −2.2
Western Asia 54.8 68.8 42.6 −22.3 83.0 20.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 73.7 142.5 70.9 −3.8 114.0 −20.0
West Africa 38.3 79.6 30.6 −20.0 39.0 −51.0
Central Africa 10.4 19.3 17.4 68.0 25.0 29.8
Eastern and Southern
Africa
25.0 43.7 22.8 −8.7 49.0 12.2
Latin America 115.3 158.0 151.9 31.8 204.0 29.1
Mexico, Central
America, and Caribbean
29.2 37.6 40.1 37.3 57.0 51.5
Upper South America 59.0 78.8 72.4 22.9 100.0 27.0
Lower South America 27.1 41.6 39.4 45.3 47.0 13.0
Source: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT and USDA PS&D databases. Projections are from IFPRI 1977 and Paulino 1986.
Notes: An error with a negative sign indicates an underestimate.
a Actual data for 1990 and 2000 are not comparable since 2000 data include more countries. In addition, food is defined including not
only cereals, roots and tubers, pulses and nuts but also cassava, and bananas and plantains. The actual figures for 1990 correspond to
the average for the 1989–91 period and the figures for 2000 correspond to the average for the 1998–99 period.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 20—Comparison between FAPRI and FAO wheat













Production 237.3 232.8 −2 228.1 −4
Australia 13.3 19.1 44 18.1 36
Canada 29.6 23.8 −20 23.7 −20
EC-10 80.2 70.1 −13 60.4 −25
India 53.0 50.3 −5 54.8 3
United States 61.2 69.5 14 71.2 16
Consumption 267.1 254.8 −5 250.8 −6
Australia 3.3 3.2 −4 3.6 8
Canada 7.0 4.5 −35 5.9 −15
EC-10 56.5 54.8 −3 47.3 −16
India 53.5 50.3 −6 54.2 1
United States 31.7 27.6 −13 27.5 −13
USSR 115.2 114.4 −1 112.3 −3
Gapb 29.8 22.0 −26 22.7 −24
Source: Actual data are from the FAOSTAT database. FAPRI projections are from Meyers, Devadoss,
and Helmar 1986, FAO projections are from FAO 1986.
Notes: An error with a negative sign indicates an underestimate.
a Average 1989–91.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 22—Comparison of two forecasts to 2000 of the dynamics of water use in the
world by human activity
Water uses (km3/year)a 1900 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Agriculture
Withdrawal 1993 525.0 893.0 1,130.0 1,550.0 1,850.0 2,290.0 2,680.0 3,250.0
Withdrawal 1999 513.0 895.0 1,080.0 1,481.0 1,743.0 2,112.0 2,425.0 2,605.0
Difference (%) 2.3 −0.2 4.6 4.7 6.1 8.4 10.5 24.8
Consumption 1993 409.0 679.0 859.0 1,180.0 1,400.0 1,730.0 2,050.0 2,500.0
Consumption 1999 321.0 586.0 722.0 1,005.0 1,186.0 1,445.0 1,691.0 1,834.0
Difference (%) 27.4 15.9 19.0 17.4 18.0 19.7 21.2 36.3
Industry
Withdrawal 1993 37.2 124.0 178.0 330.0 540.0 710.0 973.0 1,280.0
Withdrawal 1999 43.7 127.0 204.0 339.0 547.0 713.0 735.0 776.0
Difference (%) −14.9 −2.4 −12.7 −2.7 −1.3 −0.4 32.4 64.9
Consumption 1993 3.5 9.7 14.5 24.9 38.0 61.9 88.5 117.0
Consumption 1999 4.8 11.9 19.1 30.6 51.0 70.9 78.8 87.9
Difference (%) −27.2 −18.5 −24.1 −18.6 −25.5 −12.7 12.3 33.1
Municipal supply
Withdrawal 1993 16.1 36.3 52.0 82.0 130.0 200.0 300.0 441.0
Withdrawal 1999 21.5 58.9 86.7 118.0 160.0 219.0 305.0 384.0
Difference (%) −25.1 −38.4 −40.0 −30.5 −18.8 −8.7 −1.6 14.8
Consumption 1993 4.0 9.0 14.0 20.3 29.2 41.1 52.4 64.5
Consumption 1999 4.6 12.5 16.7 20.6 28.5 38.3 45.0 52.8
Difference (%) −13.2 −28.0 −16.2 −1.5 2.5 7.3 16.4 22.2
Reservoirs
Withdrawal = Consumption 1993 0.3 3.7 6.5 23.0 66.0 120.0 170.0 220.0
Withdrawal = Consumption 1999 0.3 7.0 11.1 30.2 76.1 131.0 167.0 208.0
Difference (%) 0.0 −47.1 −41.4 −23.8 −13.3 −8.4 1.8 5.8
Totalb
Withdrawal 1993 579.0 1,060.0 1,360.0 1,990.0 2,590.0 3,320.0 4,130.0 5,190.0
Withdrawal 1999 579.0 1,088.0 1,382.0 1,968.0 2,526.0 3,175.0 3,633.0 3,973.0
Difference (%) 0.0 −2.6 −1.6 1.1 2.5 4.6 13.7 30.6
Consumption 1993 417.0 701.0 894.0 1,250.0 1,540.0 1,950.0 1,360.0 2,900.0
Consumption 1999 331.0 617.0 768.0 1,086.0 1,341.0 1,686.0 1,982.0 2,182.0
Difference (%) 26.0 13.6 16.4 15.1 14.8 15.7 −31.4 32.9
Source: Shiklomanov 1993, SHI/UNESCO 1999.
Notes: The year next to withdrawal and consumption figures corresponds to the publication year.
a Withdrawal stands for total water withdrawal; consumption stands for irretrievable water loss.
b Total water use figures are rounded off.65
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